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THE CONSERVATION OF MARINE MAMMALS
USING A MULTI-PARTY APPROACH:
AN EVALUATION OF THE TAKE REDUCTION
TEAM PROCESS*
Nina M. Young**
SUMMARY
In 1993, the Center for Marine Conservation (CMC), and other
conservation organizations negotiated with the fishing industry to develop
a proposal that became the basis for the 1994 amendments to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).' The take reduction team
process is a direct outgrowth of that negotiation. Both the fishing industry
and conservation community believed it important to create a multi-party
negotiation process to devise strategies for eliminating marine mammal
entanglements in commercial fishing gear while maintaining the viability
of commercial fisheries. Thus, the mediated take reduction team process
was created. Despite difficulties in balancing both the need to reduce
marine mammal kills and minimize economic impacts on fishermen, the
take reduction team process has successfully produced consensus take
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1. NinaM. Young& Suzanne ludicello, Blueprintfor Whale Conservation: Implement-
ing the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 149, 175-182 (1997)
(discussing the implementation history of the MMPA's incidental take provisions).
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reduction plans in three of the five take reduction teams, and has succeeded
in establishing better working relationships among the different interest
groups. Dialogue that would otherwise not have taken place has resulted
in the development of creative research recommendations and strategies to
reduce marine mammal entanglement in fishing gear. Facilitators have
been essential to the success of the negotiation process; they helped to
articulate and address participant concerns, moving participants from
posturing to substance in a timely manner.
In its evolution, the negotiation process clearly had its growing pains.
Initially every take reduction team has to overcome obstacles such as lack
of familiarity, acceptance and trust in order to develop a take reduction
plan. The dynamics of each take reduction team was unique. The Gulf of
Maine Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team (GOMTRT), for example,
had a lengthy history together in its previous incarnation as the Harbor
Porpoise Working Group; moreover, its actions were intimately tied to the
New England Fishery Management Council's (NEFMC) ever-changing
actions to recover groundfish stocks. While there was familiarity, the
GOMTRT's plan was often overtaken by the actions of the NEFMC. In
contrast, some members of the Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction
Team (AOCTRT) were from competing fisheries, a situation that generated
suspicion and a general unwillingness to accept the basic premises, let
alone the outcome resulting from the group process. Moreover, the debate
was colored by the fact that National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) had
closed at least one of the fisheries represented on the team and there were
ongoing, pre-existing gear conflicts among the commercial fishing groups
that had little to do with marine mammal conflicts. The Atlantic Large
Whale Take Reduction Team (ALWTRT) was unable to reach a consensus
due to insufficient negotiation time and the added pressures originating
from an ongoing lawsuit on this issue. Yet, throughout all of this the
system worked.
The facilitators were essential in helping players get past these issues
and move through posturing to substance. Those teams that moved quickly
through their concerns about the quality of the science-the population and
bycatch estimates and the calculation of Potential Biological Removal
(PBR)-and into the development of take reduction strategies faired best
in this process. Issues of team size and time available to negotiate were
also critical. Smaller teams facilitated greater discussion and a sense that
all participants could freely express their opinions. While the MMPA's
six-month deadline pushed the teams to achieve consensus, participants
cited, in two cases, it did not allow sufficient time for consensus to be
reached. The process would benefit from two additional meetings-one to
review the final plan before it is submitted to NMFS and another during the
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comment period to allow the team to provide feedback to NMFS. In all
situations the process provided a framework for dialogue among disparate
groups-a dialogue that often resulted in creative research recommenda-
tions and strategies to reduce marine mammal entanglement in fishing gear.
Adding to the difficulties of team dynamics is the large shift in
emphasis from adversarial advocacy to a participatory planning process.
The take reduction team process represents a new way of doing business for
NMFS, fishermen, and conservation groups. NMFS is struggling with the
implementation schedule mandated within the statutory timeframes;
incorporation of take reduction plan recommendations into federal
regulations, either under the authority of MMPA or through fishery
management plans developed by the regional councils under the authority
of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery and Conservation Management Act2; the
role of the take reduction team in the development of the regulations; and
its level of commitment to this process and accountability to the take
reduction team. NMFS has yet to realize that consensus is hard-won at all
levels. In addition, NMFS has failed to recognize that this multi-party take
reduction negotiation process is equally as important to participants as the
fishery management council process. Consequently, if the take reduction
team process is to be successful, NMFS must also adopt the view that this
process is a high priority partnership among itself and all of the various
stakeholders. It must expect no less from itself than any of the other active
participants. NMFS representatives to the take reduction team must have
the ability to both evaluate the consensus from a legal perspective and
commit the agency to that consensus. This means that the Regional
Administrator, a representative from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) Office of General Counsel, and a NMFS
enforcement officer must be present at crucial times in the negotiating
process. In order to prevent the entire process from being undermined, the
NMFS representative cannot be passive, but instead must advise the team
as to whether the consensus recommendation can be easily implemented
and enforced, and whether the research recommendations are achievable.
Otherwise team members may conclude the negotiation ,process and leave
with false or unrealistic expectations, a result that undermines the process.
To further meet its commitments, NMFS must also implement the take
reduction plan within the statutory timeframes set out in the MMPA,
provide the necessary resources to achieve, adequate levels of observer
coverage, and carry out the research recommendations essential to inform
take reduction strategies. These concerns highlight the need for greater
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1853 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
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resources to implement the take reduction plans but also a greater
commitment on the part of NMFS to the process and the plans.
Finally, although the take reduction plans have been in force for
slightly over a year and some are showing some signs of success, it is too
soon to assess the efficacy of the team consensus. Furthermore, when
comparing the timetables for implementation of the take reduction plans to
the timing of assessment of progress toward reducing takes to below PBR
and achieving progress toward the zero mortality rate goal, it is clear that
NMFS may not be able to fully evaluate progress under this regime at that
time. Nevertheless, most participants look favorably upon the take
reduction team process as an alternative to the traditional adversarial notice
and comment rulemaking procedures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) is the corner-
stone of the United States' efforts to conserve and recover marine
mammals.3 Since its enactment, the MMPA has prohibited the take of
marine mammals incidental to commercial fishing unless authorized by an
incidental take permit or a small take exemption.' However, more than
twenty-five years after the MMPA's enactment, marine mammals are still
incidentally drowned in commercial fishing gear.5 The regulation of such
operations to protect marine mammals has become a critical, and often
volatile, issue.6
In 1988, incidental take of marine mammals in commercial fishing
operations reached its climax when it became apparent that NMFS was
unable to undertake the necessary determinations to authorize takes for
affected marine mammal stocks. In Kokechik Fishermen's Association v.
Secretary of Commerce,7 the court held that the permit system was
inherently flawed because there was insufficient information to determine
with any degree of certainty that incidental takes would not harm marine
mammal stocks. Diminishing marine resources, insufficient federal funds,
and inadequate information on marine mammal/commercial fishery
interactions forced the fishing industry and conservationists to develop
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421(h) (1994).
4. Id. §§ 137 1(a)(2), (3)(A) and 1374(a)-(c).
5. NINA M. YOUNG ET AL., CENTER FOR MARINE CONSERVATION, THE INCIDENTAL
CAPTURE OF MARINE MAMMALS IN U.S. FISHERIES, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 13 (Rose
Bierce and Shari Evans eds., 1993).
6. See Young & ludicello, supra note 1, at 175-82.
7. 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989).
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creative initiatives to conserve marine mammals, marine habitats, and
species diversity, while still promoting economically viable fisheries. The
first negotiation yielded a proposal that would enable fishermen to go
fishing, yet minimize the impact of that activity on marine mammals.8 It
became the basis for the MMPA amendments adopted by Congress in 1988,
which established an information gathering and an interim exemption
program for commercial fisheries.9
Again in 1993, after analysis of the interim exemption program and
NMFS' proposed long-term regime to authorize incidental takes in
commercial fisheries, 0 the environmental community and the fishing
industry held a second series of negotiations." The participants jointly
developed a series of amendments that resulted in sweeping changes to the
MMPA's provisions to govern the incidental take of marine mammals in
commercial fisheries. Congress adopted these amendments in 1994.12 The
amendments codified the informal negotiation process in the form of take
reduction teams; 13 consequently nearly six years into the implementation
of these amendments, representatives of the fishing industry, conservation
community, and federal and state agencies continue to work through these
teams to develop measures to reduce the incidental mortality and serious
injury of marine mammals in commercial fisheries.
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the take reduction team
process, and whether this type of cooperative approach can result in sound
management strategies to reduce marine mammal incidental mortality and
serious injury.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
A. Purpose and Objective of the MMPA
The MIMPA is perhaps the most comprehensive piece of marine
mammal conservation and management legislation in the world.'4 Passed
8. See Young & ludicello, supra note 1, at 175-82.
9. Id.
10. National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Draft Proposed
Regime to Govern Interactions Between Marine Mammals and Commercial Fishing
Operations, Draft Legislative Environmental Impact Statement 2.0, 2.1 (1991) [hereinafter
DLEIS].
11. See Young & ludicello, supra note 1, at 175-87.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Natasha Atkins, Summary of National Laws and International Agreements
Affecting River Dolphins, in BIOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF THE RIVER DOLPHINS, 3
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to rectify the consequences of "man's impact upon marine mammals, which
has ranged from what might be termed malign neglect to virtual
genocide,"' 5 the Act, enforced by the U.S. Departments of Commerce and
Interior, governs every interaction within U.S. jurisdiction between an
individual and a marine mammal.' 6  Its purpose is to protect marine
mammal species of "great international significance, esthetic and recre-
ational as well as economic."' 7 The species included under the Act are
whales, dolphins, porpoises, seals, sea lions, walruses, sea otters, manatees,
dugongs, and polar bears.' 8
B. The MMPA 's Moratorium on Taking
Under the MMPA, marine mammal species "should be protected and
encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with
sound policies of resource management."' 9 Another goal is to "maintain
the health and stability of the marine ecosystem."2  Congress also
mandated that whenever consistent with these goals, marine mammals are
to be protected and managed so that they do not "cease to be a significant
functioning element in the ecosystem of which they are a part,"2 or
"diminish below their optimum sustainable population [(OSP)]. ' 22  A
OCCASIONAL PAPERS OFTHE IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMMISSION (SSC) 168, 173 (1987);
see also, Nina M. Young, Is the Marine Mammal Protection Act a Marketable Commodity
to Resolve the Over-exploitation of Marine Mammals in Commercial Fisheries? 23 PROC.
INT'L Ass'N FOR AQUATIC ANIMAL MEDICINE 72 (1992).
15. H.R. REP. No. 707-92, at 11 (1971) (reporting on H.R. 10420, proposed legislation
for marine mammal protection).
16. Id.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(6). "The term 'marine mammal' means any mammal which (A)
is morphologically adapted to the marine environment (including sea otters and members of
the orders Sirenia, Pinnipedia and Cetacea), or (B) primarily inhabits the marine environ-
ment (such as the polar bear); and, for the purposes of this chapter, includes any part of any
such marine mammal, including its raw, dressed, or dyed fur or skin." Id.
19. Id. § 1361(6).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 1361(2).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 136(2). "The term 'optimum sustainable population' means, with
respect to any population stock, the number of animals that will result in the maximum
productivity of the population or the species, keeping in mind the carrying capacity of the
habitat and the health of the ecosystem of which they form a constituent element." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1362(9). The regulations define OSP as is a population size which falls within a range
from the population level of a given species or stock which is the largest supportable within
the ecosystem to the population level that results in maximum net productivity. 50 C.F.R.
§ 216.3 (2000). Maximum net productivity is defined as the greatest net annual increment
in population numbers or biomass resulting from additions to the population due to
Evaluation of the Take Reduction Team Process
species or population stock that is determined to be below its OSP level, or
is listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA, is designated as
"depleted" under the MMPA.' The MMPA also states that the "incidental
kill or incidental serious injury of marine mammals permitted in the course
of commercial fishing operations be reduced to insignificant levels
approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate."2 For these reasons,
Congress sought to achieve broad protection for marine mammals through
the VMPA by establishing a moratorium on importation and taking. 5
Ill. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1994 AMENDMENTS TO THE MMPA:
TAKE REDUCTION TEAMS AND TAKE REDUCTION PLANS
The 1994 amendments to the MMPA set out a new regime to govern
incidental takes of marine mammals during commercial fishing operations.
The underlying premise of these amendments was that decisions on
allowable takes should be based on assessments of the status of the marine
mammal stock and conducted within certain biological limits that protect
the marine mammal stocks. The major elements of the 1994 amendments
added three new sections to the MMVIPA,26 including: (1) requirements for
stock assessments, status determinations and calculation of the stock's
potential biological removal level (PBR);27 (2) requirements for the
reproduction and/or growth less losses due to natural mortality."). Id.
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(1) "The term 'depletion' or 'depleted' means any case in which
(A) the Secretary, after consultation with the Marine Mammal Commission and the
Committee of Scientific Advisors on Marine Mammals established under subchapter III of
this chapter, determines that a species or population stock is below its optimum sustainable
population; (B) aState, to which authority for the conservation and management of a species
or population stock is transferred under section 1379 of this title, determines that such
species or stock is below its optimum sustainable population; or (C) a species or population
stock is listed as an endangered species or a threatened species under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973." Id.
24. Id. § 1371(a)(2). See Mary M. Sauer, Balancing Marine Mammal Protection
Against Commercial Fishing: The Zero Mortality Goal, Quotas, and the Gulf of Maine
Harbor Porpoise, 45 ME. L. REV. 419 (1993) (presenting a more detailed review of the
legislative history of the zero mortality rate goal).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1371. "The term 'take' means to harass, hunt, capture, or kill. or
attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine mammal." Id. § 1362(13).
26. See Young and ludicello, supra note 1, at 175-82 (discussing the implementation
history of the MMPA's incidental take provisions and a section-by-section discussion of the
1994 amendments).
27. Potential Biological Removal (PBR) level is calculated by: (N,m,)(R.,1)(Fr) where
N,,i,, is the minimum stock abundance, R.,1 is the rate of increase at the maximum net
productivity level, and Fr is a recovery factor. Default values for unknown Rpl are 6% for
pinnipeds and sea otters and 2% for cetaceans and manatees. Fr is 1.0 for stocks at OSP, 0.5
for depleted and threatened stocks and stocks of unknown status, and 0.1 for endangered
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commercial fishing industry, modeled largely after the interim exemption
and contained in new section 118; and (3) provisions for a process whereby
the states and NMFS can address pinniped and fishery resource interac-
tions, contained in new section 120.28 The incidental take provisions of
section 118 also include provisions for vessel registration, observer
coverage, emergency regulatory authority, the zero mortality rate goal,
convening of incidental take reduction teams and preparation of take
reduction plans, and prohibition of intentional marine mammal killing by
fishers.29 This analysis will focus on take reduction team process and the
development of take reduction plans.
The MMPA requires that a take reduction plan be developed for each
strategic marine mammal stock30 that interacts with a fishery that frequently
or occasionally kills or seriously injures marine mammals. 3' Take
reduction plans, among other things, are to include team-recommended
regulatory and voluntary measures designed to reduce incidental mortality
and serious injury of marine mammals, and proposed dates for achieving
specific objectives. 32 The immediate goal of the take reduction plan for a
strategic stock is to reduce incidental mortality and serious injury to levels
less than the PBR calculated in the stock assessment within six months of
implementation. 3 The long-term goal of the plan is to reduce incidental
mortality and serious injury to insignificant levels approaching a zero
mortality rate within five years, taking into account the economics of the
fishery, existing technology, and applicable state or regional fishery
management plans. 4 Take reduction team members are drawn from
stocks. Recovery factors are in relation to current carrying capacity. The PBR value is the
maximum number of marine mammals that can be removed (killed or injured) from a stock
by all forms of take (exclusive of natural mortalities) while still ensuring the recovery of the
stock to allow it to reach its optimum sustainable population level. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(20).
28. See Nina M. Young, et al., At Point Blank Range: The Genesis and Implementation
of the Lethal Removal Provisions Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 5 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing the implementation history of MMPA's lethal take
provisions).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1387.
30. Id. § 1362(19) (defining a strategic stock as: (1) one for which the level of direct
human-caused mortality exceeds the PBR; (2) which is declining and likely to be listed as
a threatened species under the ESA within the foreseeable future; or (3) which is already
listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA or designated as depleted under the
MMPA).
31. Subsection (f) sets out requirements for the development of take reduction plans to
"assist in the recovery or prevent the depletion of each strategic stock which interacts with
a [listed] commercial fishery." Id. § 1387(0(1).
32. Id. § 1387(0(4).
33. Id. § 1386(0(2).
34. Id. § 1387(0(2).
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federal agencies, coastal states, regional fishery management councils,
interstate fisheries commissions, academic and scientific organizations,
environmental groups, commercial and recreational fisheries groups,
Alaska Native or Indian tribal organizations, and others deemed appropri-
ate.35 Take reduction plans for stocks listed as endangered are to be
consistent with ESA recovery plans.36
To date, NMFS has convened five take reduction teams: (1) Gulf of
Maine Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team (GOMTRT), (2) Mid-
Atlantic Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team (MATRT), (3) Pacific
Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team (POCTRT), (4) Atlantic Offshore
Cetacean Take Reduction Team (AOCTRT), and (5) the Atlantic Large
Baleen Whale Take Reduction Team (ALWTRT). All of these teams have
completed and submitted draft take reduction plans to NMFS. This paper
reviews the contents of these plans, the negotiated process to develop them,
and NMFS implementation.
A. Gulf of Maine Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team (GOMTRT)
1. Background on Harbor Porpoise Take in the Gulf of Maine
The incidental catch of harbor porpoise in the Gulf of Maine multispec-
ies sink gillnet fishery has been previously documented. 7 Pursuant to both
the 1988 and 1994 MMPA amendments, NMFS classified the Gulf of
Maine sink gillnet fishery as Category I, which denotes that this fishery has
"frequent incidental takes of marine mammals."3 Category I fishers are
obligated, when requested by NMFS, to take observers on fishing trips.3"
Observers in this fishery documented the historical catch of harbor porpoise
incidental to the Gulf of Maine sink gillnet fishery:' 2,900 individuals in
1990,2,000 in 1991, 1,200 in 1992, 1,400 in 1993, 2,100 in 1994, 1,400 in
1995, 1,200 in 1996, and 782 in 1997.41 In the 1995 harbor porpoise stock
35. Id. § 1387(f)(6)(C).
36. Id. § 1387(f)(11).
37. Taking of Marine Mammal Incidental to Commercial fishing Operations; Interim
Exemption for Commercial Fisheries, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,072, 16,078 (Apr. 20, 1989)
[hereinafter Taking of Marine Mammals]; Final List of Fisheries for 1996, 60 Fed. Reg.
67,064, 67,068 (Dec. 28, 1995).
38. See Taking of Marine Mammals, supra note 37.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(d)(2).
40. GuIr OF MAINE/BAY OF FUNDY HARBOR PoRPOIsE TAKE REDUCTION TEAM TAKE
REDUCTION PLAN at 10 (Aug. 7, 1996) [hereinafter GULFOFMAINE TAKE REDUCTION PLAN]
(describing the Gulf of Maine sink gilinet fishery).
41. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, 1998
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assessment, NMFS estimated the mean stock size at 54,300 animals and
established a PBR level for this stock of 48342 harbor porpoise.4 3 Harbor
porpoise are a strategic stock because the level of mortality in the fishery
greatly exceeds PBR 44
2. The Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team and Plan
Because mortality exceeded PBR, NMFS established a take reduction
team pursuant to section 118(f) of the MMPA.45 The GOMTRT was
unique, in that there had been a history of efforts to define and reduce the
level of incidental take of harbor porpoise. Members from a group
previously known as the Harbor Porpoise Working Group46 were asked to
participate in the take reduction team. They had worked with the NEFMC
in the past, under the multispecies fishery management plan, to define and
reduce levels of incidental take of harbor porpoise. Unfortunately, those
conservation efforts failed, as evidenced by bycatch estimates, which
remained over 1,200 animals at the time the GOMTRT was convened. 4
7
MARINE MAMMAL STOCK ASSESSMENTS (U.S. PACIFIC, ATLANTIC AND GULF OF MEXICO)
(1998); see also MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 37
(2000) [hereinafter 1999 MMC Report].
42. The 1994 stock assessment estimated the mean stock size at 47,500 and established
a PBR of 403 animals. GULF OF MAINE TAKE REDUCTION PLAN, supra note 40, at 4, 6;
NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, 1995 MARINE MAMMAL STOCK ASSESSMENTS (U.S.
PACIFIC, ATLANTIC AND GULF OF MEXICO) (1995).
43. The original PBR for this stock was 403 animals according to the 1995 stock
assessment; it was later revised to 483 animals. Marine Mammals, 62 Fed. Reg. 3005, 3006
(Jan. 21, 1997).
44. Marine Mammal Stock Assessment Report, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,008 (Oct. 4, 1995); see
Threatened Fish and Wildlife; Listing of the Gulf of Maine Population of Harbor Porpoise
as Threatened Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 58 Fed. Reg. 3108 (Jan. 7, 1993)
[hereinafter Gulf of Maine Harbor Porpoise].
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(f).
46. In 1989, fishers, environmentalists, and scientists formed the Harbor Porpoise
Working Group. The purpose of the group was to define the extent of the harbor
porpoise/gillnet interaction problem and to identify solutions that would adequately protect
harbor porpoise with minimal impacts on the fishery.
47. Gulf of Maine Take Reduction Plan, supra note 40, at 7; see also, Sonja V.
Fordham, New England Groundfish: From Glory to Grief A Portrait of America 's Most
Devastated Fishery, CENTER FOR MARINE CONSERVATION 71 (1996) (discussing the history
of harbor porpoise take reduction efforts); Gulf of Maine Harbor Porpoise, supra note 44,
at 3108 (discussing the NEFMC's harbor porpoise bycatch mitigation measures adopted
under the framework adjustment to Amendment 5 of the Multispecies Fishery Management
Plan); Northeast Multispecies Fishery, 59 Fed. Reg. 26,972 (May 25, 1994) (instituting time
and area closures contained in Framework Adjustment 4 to the Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan for sink gillnet gear as a final rule); Northeast Multispecies Fishery;
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The GOMTRT was convened in February 1996."s The GOMTRT's
goal was to develop a consensus take reduction plan that contained
measures the team thought likely to reduce the incidental mortality of
harbor porpoise in sink gillnets to PBR within six months of the plan's
implementation. 9 The GOMTRT met five times between February and
July 1996 and submitted a consensus draft plan on August 8, 1996,0 within
the six-month timeline stipulated in the MMPA.5 The core management
plan focused on bycatch in waters from Maine to Rhode Island and
proposed to reduce harbor porpoise bycatch by requiring a combination of
pinger (acoustic devices designed to warn cetaceans of the presence of a
net) use and the application of two types of time/area closures; one in
which fishing is prohibited altogether and the other in which fishing is
permitted only when nets are equipped with pingers5 2 To the extent
possible, the plan incorporated the NEFMC harbor porpoise and groundfish
closures to limit the additional regulatory burden placed on the gillnet
fishery.53 The agreement was also contingent on a rolling six-month
evaluation of the plan, a pinger experiment conducted in the mid-coast area
in spring of 1997 (modeled after a 1994 experiment 4 with a bycatch cap of
70 harbor porpoise), and investigations into the potential habituation and
displacement effects of pingers on harbor porpoise and their effects on
other marine life." Finally, the plan prescribed other measures, mandating
cooperation between fishermen and researchers to estimate gillnet fleet
effort; undertaking outreach, training and certification activities; establish-
ing guidelines for enforcement; initiating greater cooperation with Canada;
and included other provisions to strengthen the potential for successfully
meeting plan goals and objectives.5 6
Framework Adjustment 12, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,207 (Oct. 30, 1995) (expanding the
Framework 4 closures).
48. The GOMTRT included representatives of the NE multispecies sink gillnet fishery,
NMFS, state marine resource managers, NEFMC, environmental organizations, and
academic and scientific organizations. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Com-
mercial Fishing Operations; Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg.
66,464, 66,465 (Dec. 2, 1998) [hereinafter December TRP Regulations].
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(f)(5)(A).
50. December TRP Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,465.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(f)(7)(A)(i).
52. GuLF OF MAINE TAKE REDUCrION PLAN, supra note 40, at 11-12.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Scott D. Kraus et al.,AcousticAlarms Reduce Porpoise Mortality, 388 NATURE525
(1997).
55. GULFOFMAINE TAKE REDUCrION PLAN, supra note 40, at 11-12.
56. Id. at 11-28.
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Although the MMPA requires that NMFS publish the proposed take
reduction plan within 60 days of draft submission (October 7, 1996) 7 the
agency did not publish the plan for over one year (August 13, 1997)." 8
When the take reduction plan was finally published as a proposed rule for
public comment, NMFS had modified it for consistency with the NEFMC
Framework Adjustment 1959 to the New England Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan. This action resulted in modifications to the plan's
groundfish and harbor porpoise closures that did not match the consensus
in the take reduction team negotiation process.'
Meanwhile, during 1996 the NEFMC implemented a plan similar to the
proposed harbor porpoise take reduction plan, including requirements for
area closures and pinger use on gillnets. In December 1997, the GOMTRT
reviewed the bycatch data presented by NMFS,6' and agreed that the
proposed take reduction plan, as published, would not reduce mortality
below PBR.6' NMFS's data clearly showed that under the NEFMC plan,
overall bycatch levels remained unchanged. As harbor porpoise mortality
dropped in some regulated areas, fishing efforts shifted and increased
offshore in non-regulated areas, causing bycatch to increase in those areas.
The GOMTRT agreed on a number of additional measures to reduce
bycatch and sent a report to NMFS on January 14, 1998.63 In formulating
these measures, the GOMTRT evaluated potential changes being consid-
ered by the NEFMC to Framework 25 of the New England Multispecies
Fishery Management Plan, including additional closures for the protection
of severely depleted groundfish, which partially overlapped the timing of
existing marine mammal closures. 64 The GOMTRT ultimately recom-
mended expanding closure and pinger requirements.65
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(f)(7)(B)(i).
58. December TRP Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,465.
59. Fisheries of the Northeastern United States: Northeast Multispecies Fishery;
Framework Adjustment 19, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,774 (Oct. 29, 1996).
60. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Gulf
of Maine Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,302 (Aug. 13,
1997) [hereinafter Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction].
61. December TRP Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,465.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (specifying the closures as: (1) Northeast Closure, Aug. 15-Sept. 13; (2) Cape
Cod South, Mar. 1-Mar. 31; (3) Massachusetts Bay, Mar. I-Mar. 31; (4) Mid-Coast Area,
Mar. 24-Apr. 26; (5) Mid-Coast Area, pingers required Sept. 15-Mar.24 and Apr. 26-May
31; (6) Cape Cod South, pingers required Sept.-May; (7) Massachusetts Bay, pingers
required Feb. and Apr.; and (8) Offshore Area, pingers required Sept. I-May 31). Id.
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By 1998, NMFS had violated every statutory deadline for developing
the harbor porpoise take reduction plan and implementing regulations.
Moreover, NMFS failed to comply with the MMPA's extended, statutorily
mandated date of April 1, 1997, by which time NMFS was to have
established a plan that would reduce the take level to less than PBR.' Due
to the combination of NMFS's internal delays in plan implementation and
frequent changes to the New England Multispecies Fishery Management
Plan closures to protect depleted groundfish stocks (which affected harbor
porpoise bycatch), a situation emerged in mid-1998 in which no adequate
take reduction plan was implemented to reduce harbor porpoise mortality.
Mortality still numbered over three times the permissible level. Therefore,
on August 21, 1998, two years after the original draft take reduction plan
was submitted, the Center for Marine Conservation, the Humane Society
of the United States, and the International Wildlife Coalition filed suit in
U.S. district court to compel NMFS to adopt a final rule to implement a
take reduction plan to protect harbor porpoises.67 The two-count complaint
alleged that: (1) NMFS had violated the MMPA by failing to publish a take
reduction plan to reduce the incidental mortality and serious injury of
harbor porpoise below the PBR, and (2) NMFS had violated the ESA by
failing to take final action on its proposed rule to list harbor porpoise as
threatened within the prescribed time frame.68
The suit did not proceed to court because a settlement was reached.
NMFS agreed to publish a final take reduction plan for the Gulf of Maine
harbor porpoise by December 1, 1998,69 provide an update on the status of
the research required by the take reduction plan, and provide information
on harbor porpoise incidental take levels on a quarterly basis through
December 2001.70 In addition, NMFS was to implement a phase-in
program for pingers in the Gulf of Maine and conduct a biological status
review of harbor porpoise by March 31, 2000 to determine whether the
listing decision should be revisited.7
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1387(f)(5)(A), 13890)(2).
67. Plaintiffs Complaint, Center for Marine Conservation et al. v. Daley et al. (D.
D.C. 1998) (Civ. No. 1:98CV02029 EGS).
68. Id. at 3-4.
69. Revised Settlement Agreement at 2, CenterforMarine Conservation et al. v. Daley
et al. (USDC D.C. 1998) (Civ. No. 1:98CV02029 EGS) (order approving settlement signed
on May 12, 2000). This final rule was to implement both the Gulf of Maine and the Mid-
Atlantic take reduction plans.
70. Id. at 2-4.
71. Id. at 2-3.
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The final rule was published on December 2, 199872 and included the
following requirements for the Gulf of Maine: (1) Northeast Area, closed
August 15 through September 13; (2) Cape Cod South Area, closed March
I through March 31; (3) Massachusetts Bay Area, closed March 1 through
March 31; (4) Mid-Coast Area, pingers required September 15 through
May 31; (5) Cape Cod South, pingers required December 1 through
February 28/29 and April 1 through May 31; (6) Massachusetts Bay,
pingers required December 1 through February 28/29 and April 1 through
May 31; (7) Offshore Area, pingers required November 1 through May 31;
(8) Cashes Ledge Area, closed February 1 through 28/29. 73
3. Evaluation of the GOMTRT Process and Plan
In December 1999, the GOMTRT met to evaluate the progress of the
take reduction plan. NMFS indicated that the bycatch for the first eight
months of 1999 was 227 harbor porpoises (174 porpoises off New England
and 53 porpoises off mid-Atlantic coastal states).74 In the final analyses
several takes of harbor porpoise during the fall of 1999 in the Mid-Coast
area increased the mortality estimate for the Gulf of Maine, but did not
cause it to exceed PBR. In May 2000, NMFS notified the plaintiffs and the
GOMTRT that total harbor porpoise bycatch for 1999 for the Northeast
sink gillnet and Mid-Atlantic coastal gillnet fisheries was 342 animals-a
number less than PBR (483). 7' Therefore, while there were significant
reductions in harbor porpoise bycatch, it is still uncertain whether these
reductions were attributable to the success of the plan or to the extensive
closures for the conservation of groundfish stocks. The author believes the
groundfish closures contributed significantly to the reduction in harbor
porpoise bycatch. The GOMTRT recommended to NMFS that it: (1)
monitor progress toward PBR, (2) continue the research called for in the
initial take reduction plan, (3) undertake the recommendations in the
GOMTRT's initial plan regarding developing mechanisms to improve the
measure of effort, (4) devise an enforcement plan, (5) undertake a
retrospective analysis of pinger data to evaluate different methods to
estimate bycatch, (6) support and develop a study into acoustically
72. December TRP Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,466.
73. Id.
74 1999 M MC Report, supra note 41, at 41.
75. Letter from Patricia A. Kurkal, Regional Administrator, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, to Nina Young, Director
of Marine Wildlife Conservation, Center for Marine Conservation (May 31, 2000) (on file
with Ocean & Coastal Law Journal) [hereinafter Kurkal letter].
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reflective fishing gear, (7) conduct experiments to evaluate the effective-
ness of pingers at a various frequencies, (8) conduct random checks to
determine whether pingers are functioning properly, (9) check whether
pingers are working properly when a take occurs in a pingered net, (10)
investigate other mechanisms to reduce bycatch to the zero mortality rate
goal, and (11) monitor NEFMC deliberations to assess the impact of their
actions on harbor porpoise take reduction measures.76
During the initial negotiations, there was lengthy debate over the
adequacy of the bycatch and population abundance estimates. As noted,
the GOMTRT recommended several research strategies to address this
concern.77 Once the members of the fishing industry generally accepted the
validity of available data, the GOMTRT was able to achieve consensus by
using a spreadsheet analysis-this proved to be a critical tool that helped
the group arrive at consensus.78 The analysis allowed the team to estimate
bycatch reduction based on a formula that assigned pinger effectiveness
levels to different times and areas where bycatch occurred, based on
previous pinger experiments and bycatch estimates.79 The GOMTRT then
closed areas with peak bycatch and cushioned the closure period at both'
starting and ending points with pinger-use requirements for the months on
either side of the closure.8" This mechanism provided a clear means by
which to evaluate the effects of closure and pinger use.
NMFS's failure to implement the consensus plan was perhaps the
greatest downfall in the process. Despite the questioning of every scientific
estimate by the team members, including PBR, population abundance,
bycatch, and effort, the GOMTRT eventually overcame these concerns to
achieve consensus on a plan. NMFS violated the team's faith in the
process by failing to implement the plan within the statutory timeframes.
Consequently, the consensus take reduction plan was overtaken by the
NEFMC actions to conserve harbor porpoise and depleted grQundfish
stocks. This resulted in two changes to the original consensus plan, one
generated by the GOMTRT to the original proposed rule in 199781 and the
other adopted at NMFS's discretion to the 1998 proposed rule. 2 These
actions, especially the latter, generally undermined the GOMTRT's plan
76. RESOLVE, GULF OF MAINE HARBOR PORPOISE TAKE REDUCTION TEAM, FINAL
MEETING SUMMARY 15 (1999).
77. GULF OFMAINE TAKE REDUCTION PLAN, supra note 40, at 22-23.
78. Id. at 14-15.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction, supra note 60, at 43,302. December TRP
Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,465.
82. December TRP Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,464.
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and efforts. Moreover, the disparity between GOMTRT and NEFMC
policies and action contributed to the flawed implementation of the plan.
Even though the NEFMC has several representatives on the GOMTRT, the
team found that there remains a general lack of co-ordination between these
two bodies, so much so, that actions taken under various FMPs threaten the
conservation efforts of the GOMTRT and its plan.
Additionally, the process was further marred by the lawsuit. Because
of NMFS's failure to comply with the statutory timeframes of the MMPA,
the conservation groups that had participated on the GOMTRT were forced
to sue NMFS to implement the plan. Even though the lawsuit contested
only NMFS's failure to meet the MMPA deadlines for implementation and
not the adequacy of the plan itself, the suit divided the plaintiffs from
members of the GOMTRT, who objected to the suit. This split was due, in
part, to erroneous beliefs held by some GOMTRT members that the lawsuit
resulted in changes to the plan, and therefore, the plaintiffs had violated the
consensus agreement.
Finally, while the 1999 harbor porpoise bycatch is now believed to be
below PBR. NMFS and the GOMTRT cannot, with any certainty, attribute
this success to the take reduction plan. In fact, this reduction is most likely
the result of the sweeping closures placed on the Northeast sink gillnet
fishery to recover severely depleted groundfish stocks. The author believes
that if the NEFMC modifies or removes these closures, harbor porpoise
bycatch will likely increase because these closures are not codified as part
of the regulations to reduce harbor porpoise bycatch. Consequently, the
future of harbor porpoise bycatch efforts is not only uncertain, it remains
intimately tied to the actions of the NEFMC.
B. Mid-Atlantic Take Reduction Team (MATRT)
1. Background on Harbor Porpoise Takes in the Mid-Atlantic
In the spring during the early 1990s, harbor porpoise began washing
ashore along the Mid-Atlantic coast with net marks and other physical signs
of interactions with the commercial fisheries.8 3 Beginning in 1995, NMFS
placed observers in Mid-Atlantic gillnet vessels. NMFS estimated harbor
porpoise bycatch at approximately 103 animals.84 However, between 1996
and 1998, harbor porpoise bycatch increased to 310 in 1996, 572 in 1997,
83. 1999 MMC Report, supra note 41, at 36.
84. Id. at 37.
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and 446 in 1998, likely due to a combination of increased fishing effort and
85better observer coverage.
2. The Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team and Plan
"In February 1997, NMFS convened the MATRT to address the
incidental bycatch of harbor porpoise in Mid-Atlantic gillnet fisheries
(from New York through North Carolina). 86 '"The MATRT included
representatives of the Mid-Atlantic gillnet fisheries, NMFS, state marine
resource managers, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council
(MAFMC), the NEFMC, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission
(ASMFC), environmental organizations, and academic and scientific
organizations."87 The MATRT adopted objectives to determine when and
where harbor porpoise were becoming entangled along the Mid-Atlantic
and to develop recommendations for reducing bycatch below PBR in
conjunction with the GOMTRT.88 Another objective of the MATRT was
to develop recommendations for the collection and analysis of abundance,
stock structure, and bycatch data for coastal bottlenose dolphins.89 'The
MATRT submitted a report to NMFS on August 25, 1997, which included
both consensus and non-consensus recommendations."'
In this report, the MATRT recommended management measures
specific to the two predominant coastal gillnet fisheries, the monkfish and
dogfish fisheries.9' It recommended a timeframe for effectiveness from
January through April off New Jersey and from February through April off
the southern Mid-Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, Virginia and North
Carolina).92 For the monkfish fishery, the measures that demonstrated the
greatest potential for bycatch reduction included: reduced floatline length
( 3,900 ft. or 4,800 ft. depending on the location); larger twine size (> .90
mm); mesh size (12 in.2); tie downs; and a limit of 80 nets.93
For the dogfish fishery, the measures included reduced floatline length
(.3,000 ft. or 2,118 ft depending on the location), larger twine size
85. Id.
86. December TRP Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,465.
87. Id.
88. MID-ATLANTIC TAKE REDUCTION TEAM, MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING BYCATCH OFHARBOR PORPOISE IN THE MID-ATLANTIC
GILLNET FISHERIES (1997) [hereinafter MATRT RECOMMENDATIONS].
89. Id. at6.
90. December TRP Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,465.
91. MATRT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 88, at 1.
92. Id. at 1-2.
93. MATRT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 88, at 1.
2001]
310 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:293
( .81mm) mesh size ( 6.5 in.), and a 45-net limit. 94 Additionally, the
MATRT recommended time/area closures for the monkfish fishery in New
Jersey waters from February 15 through March 15 and in the southern Mid-
Atlantic as a 20-day block between February and April, chosen by the
fishermen.95 There were, however, no time/area closures for the dogfish
fishery.
9 6
The MATRT also made recommendations to provide education and
outreach opportunities for members of the fishing industry, to improve
bycatch estimates, to increase observer coverage, and to evaluate the
observer program to ensure that coverage is random and representative. 97
For the Mid-Atlantic coastal bottlenose dolphin, the MATRT recommended
five research areas to: "(a) Identify Functionally Discrete Stocks Of Coastal
Bottlenose Dolphins; (b) Generate Reliable Population Estimates For
Coastal Bottlenose Dolphins; (c) Generate Reliable Estimates Of Fishery-
Related Mortality And Injury; (d) Continue And Improve Regional
Stranding Networks; [and] (e) Characterize Fisheries That May Interact
With Bottlenose Dolphins. 98
During the deliberations, the MATRT determined that a substantial
portion of the harbor porpoise bycatch was from New England vessels that
were fishing with finer twine and more nets.99 This fishing strategy
resulted in a higher level of harbor porpoise bycatch than the gear used by
the local fishermen;'0° consequently, the MATRT based its bycatch
reduction strategies on fishing practices used by local fishermen.'
Recognizing that the gear modifications proposed by the team would
require New England vessels to make a sizable financial investment in new
gear if they were to fish in this area, the fishing industry proposed a
federally-funded pinger experiment.'0 2 However, the MATRT did not
achieve consensus on whether a scientifically valid pinger experiment
should be part of the management regime due to unresolved concerns about
funding such an experiment, target fishery, diversion of observers to the
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. at 1-2.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. Id. at 6-8.
99. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Harbor
Porpoise Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,670, 48,678 (Sept. 11, 1998)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. § 229) [hereinafter September Regulations]; MATRT RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, supra note 88, at non-consensus Items A-1.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. MATRT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 88, at non-consensus Items A-1.
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experiment, and concerns about whether a statistical design could be devise
for a fishery with limited bycatch.' °3
Again, NMFS failed to publish the plan within sixty days (October 25,
1997), and it was not until more than one year after the MATRT submitted
its plan that NMFS, on September 11, 1998, published a proposed rule
combining the Mid-Atlantic and the Gulf of Maine take reduction plans."
Because NMFS failed to meet its statutory deadlines for implementation of
the Mid-Atlantic take reduction plan and thus was in violation of the
MMPA, the Center for Marine Conservation, the Humane Society of the
United States and the International Wildlife Coalition included the Mid-
Atlantic take reduction plan in the lawsuit against NMFS. 05 The settlement
agreement, noted above, also required NMFS to include the MATRT' s plan
in the final rule, which was published on December 2, 1998. 06
Generally, the final rule for the Mid-Atlantic components of the harbor
porpoise take reduction plan was consistent with the team proposal, with
a few exceptions. Gear modifications and the effective closure periods
from January 1 through April 30 for New Jersey waters, and February 1
through April 30 for southern Mid-Atlantic waters, remained the same as
those proposed in the plan. 7 Tables 1 and 2 summarize the final rule's
gear modifications requirements for the large mesh (includes gillnet with
mesh size of greater than 7 inches (17.78 cm) to 18 inches (45.72 cm)) and
small mesh (includes gillnet with mesh size of greater than 5 inches (12.7
cm) to less than 7 inches (17.78cm)) gillnet fisheries in the Mid-Atlantic.'08
The most significant modification to the MATRT's plan was the
application of gear modifications to all gillnet fisheries that use a mesh size
of less than 7 inches (17.78 cm) but greater than 5 inches (12.7 cm), and the
change in the stratification of gear modifications from fishery or subfishery
to gear modifications based on mesh size. 9 NMFS concluded that the
regulatory measures should not be based on subfisheries but on the
characteristics that appear most related to harbor porpoise bycatch."
Moreover, NMFS claimed that basing regulatory measures on the
subfisheries would be difficult to administer and enforce, especially
because there was not a fishery management plan or permit system in place
103. Id. at A-2.
104. September Regulations, supra note 99, at 48,670.
105. See Plaintiffs complaint, supra note 67.
106. See December TRP Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,465.
107. Id. at 66,470.
108. Id. at 66,468.
109. Id. at 66,470.
110. September Regulations, supra note 99, at 48,678.
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under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
for either fishery. "' While NMFS's argument for managing the fishery by
mesh size rather than by subfishery is sound, it had the unintended
consequences of including other fisheries that do not have a demonstrated
take of harbor porpoise, such as the striped bass fishery. If NMFS had
raised these concerns within the negotiation forum, the MATRT could have
proposed management measures for restricting only those gear types that
have the demonstrated potential to catch harbor porpoise.
In terms of closures, the final take reduction plan differs from the
MATRT's recommendations with regard to the timing of area closures." 2
For the large mesh fishery (the monkfish fishery), the MATRT recom-
mended a closure for New Jersey waters, including the Mudhole, from
February 15 through March 15."' Based on bycatch data, NMFS created
two closures, one from February 15 through March 15 at the Mudhole and
another from April 1 through April 20 for all of New Jersey." 4
The MATRT also recommended that the southern Mid-Atlantic be
closed for a block of 20 days between February and April, the timing of the
closure to be determined by the individual fishers." 5 Again, because
NMFS concluded that such a closure would be difficult to enforce, NMFS
mandated a set closure from February 15 through March 15 in the southern
Mid-Atlantic, consistent with the timing of high harbor porpoise bycatch. "6
No time or area closures were recommended for the dogfish fishery (a
small mesh fishery); however, NMFS, concerned about the high level of
takes the area around the Mudhole, mandated a one-month closure from
February 15 through March 15 in the Mudhole, to coincide with high
fishing effort and the majority of the takes in northern New Jersey during
February through April time period." 7
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. September Regulations, supra note 99, at 48,678; see also December TRP
Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,470.
114. September Regulations, supra note 99, at 48,678; see also December TRP
Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,470 (indicating no change from the September Regula-
tions).
115. September Regulations, supra note 99, at 48,678.
116. Id.
117. September Regulations, supra note 99, at 48,678; see also December TRP
Regulations, supra note 48, at 66,470.
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3. Evaluation of the MATRT Process and Plan
In January 2000, the MATRT met to evaluate the take reduction plan.
During the first eight months of 1999, 53 harbor porpoises were taken off
the mid-Atlantic coastal states."' As previously stated, NMFS had not
completed analyses of the bycatch and effort data for 1999 to determine
whether the takes exceeded PBR. However, in May 2000, NMFS notified
the plaintiffs and the GOTRT that total harbor porpoise bycatch for 1999
for the Northeast sink gillnet and Mid-Atlantic coastal gillnet fisheries was
342 animals-a number less than PBR (483). 1  NMFS's preliminary data
indicated that the reductions were due to a combination of the plan and
fishery management restrictions. 20 In addition, the MATRT expressed
concern about the insufficient observer coverage to encompass all of the
fisheries in this area, a lack of enforcement, and poor fisher compliance
with the plan and requirements of the MMPA (specifically the requirement
to register and take observers), and the continuing need for an improved
estimate of effort.'2 ' The MATRT recommended that NMFS address these
issues. 22
While the plan itself has been fairly successful, some MATRT
members expressed frustration with NMFS's delay in implementation, and
more importantly, the changes that were made to the plan without
consulting the MATRT. 123 Some MATRT members felt that NMFS had
severely undermined the integrity of the take reduction team process by
modifying the plan to focus on gear and mesh size rather than a particular
fishery. 24 In doing so, NMFS included small mesh fisheries such as shad
and striped bass and some internal waters such as the Delaware Bay that the
MATRT had not envisioned including during their negotiations or in their
recommendations."2 Many of the members believed that the problems that
resulted from these additions could have been avoided if NMFS had
discussed these changes with the MATRT during the comment period on
the proposed rule or raised these issues during negotiations. 26
118. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1999 41 (2000)
[hereinafter 1999 Report].
119. Kurkal letter, supra note 75.
120. MATRT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 88, at 2.
121. Id. at4-5.
122. MID-ATLANTIC HARBOR PORPOISE TAKE RREDUCTION TEAM, Final Meeting
Summary (Jan. 13-14, 2000) at 13.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 4-5.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id. at 4.
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The MATRT recommended that NMFS convene the MATRT during the
comment period on the proposed rule to gather their input on the plan. 12
7
Finally, while many members were initially both disenchanted with the
process and disheartened by the MATRT's failure to achieve consensus on
all aspects of the take reduction plan-specifically the pinger experi-
ment-the team, at their January meeting, recommended that the fishing
industry pursue mitigation strategies for harbor porpoise and bottlenose
dolphins. 128 At this point, these strategies included acoustic deterrent
devices and reflective gillnets, and the MATRT requested that NMFS
provide technical advice for such efforts and work cooperatively with
industry to pursue funding.'29 Given this outcome, if there had been more
time, the MATRT may have reached consensus on this issue. Because they
did not, individuals on both sides questioned the others' motives, and in
one unfortunate instance this led to the industry verbally attacking the
professional integrity of a scientist. Where consensus is not achieved, there
regrettably appears to be a tendency for one group to lash out at another.
C. Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team (A OCTRT)
1. Background on Marine Mammal Takes in the Atlantic Offshore
Fisheries
The U.S. Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico pelagic drift gillnet fishery for
swordfish, tuna, and shark interacts with six to nine strategic marine
mammal stocks, including long-finned and short-finned pilot whales,
common dolphins, Atlantic spotted dolphins, the offshore stock of
bottlenose dolphin, humpback whales, northern right whales, and sperm
whales.13' The U.S. Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico pelagic longline fishery
for swordfish, tuna, and shark interacts with two strategic marine mammal
stocks: Pilot whales and Atlantic spotted dolphins. 3 ' Table 3 summarizes
the level of take for these strategic stocks. 31
127. Id. at 13.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. ROBERTA. BLAYLOCK ET AL., NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, U.S. ATLANTIC
AND GULF OF MEXICO MARINE MAMMAL STOCK ASSESSMENTS (1995); see also Taking of
Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic Offshore Cetacean
Take Reduction Plan Environmental Assessment, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,657 (Nov. 4, 1997)
[hereinafter November Regulations].
131. BLAYLOCK, supra note 130; see also November Regulations, supra note 130;
Marine Mammals, 62 Fed. Reg 3005 (Jan. 21, 1997).
132. BLAYLOCK, supra note 130; see SUSAN PODZIBA & ASSOCIATES, ATLANTIC
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2. Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team
NMFS established the AOCTRT on May 23, 1996 to prepare a take
reduction plan to reduce bycatch of the strategic marine mammal stocks,
including right whales, humpback whales, sperm whales, beaked whales,
pilot whales, common dolphins, bottlenose dolphins, and spotted dolphins
in the U.S. Atlantic pelagic drift gillnet, longline and pair trawl fisheries. '33
The AOCTRT reached consensus on several take reduction strategies in
each fishery and submitted a draft Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take
Reduction Plan to NMFS on November 25, 1996.134 In both the drift gillnet
and longline fisheries, the plan prohibited fishing in right whale critical
habitat areas to reduce the risk of entanglement.135 For each fishery, the
AOCTRT recommended that NMFS prepare and distribute education and
outreach materials and conduct workshops for the fishing industry. 3 6 The
AOCTRT also recommended that NMFS develop criteria for assessing
marine mammal injuries and convene a workshop to review all existing
marine mammal injury data in order to: (1) develop guidelines for
determining and recording serious injury, (2) recommend changes and/or
additions to observer logs or reporting forms, (3) recommend necessary
research, including methods for monitoring the fate of entangled and
released animals, and (4) develop operation procedures for the fleet to
minimize injuries and maximize survivorship of marine mammals when
interactions with the fisheries do occur.'37 In addition, the AOCTRT
recommended that a technical advisory group be formed to assist in the
implementation of the take reduction plan and to prioritize research on
cetacean behavior and abundance. 38
For the drift gillnet fishery only, AOCTRT-recommended strategies
included: (1) monitoring of vessels with 100 percent observer coverage; (2)
establishing a limited entry program for the swordfish drift gillnet fishery;
(3) prohibiting drift gillnet gear south of Hudson Canyon from December
I through May 30; (4) designing a set allocation system to reduce the derby
nature of the fishery; (5) experimenting with pinger use during the 1997
fishing season for all vessels (100% participation); (6) conducting real-time
monitoring and evaluation of bycatch; (7) facilitating information sharing
133. Atlantic Offshore Fisheries Take Reduction Team Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 25,846
(May 23, 1996).
134. November Regulations, supra note 130, at 59,657.
135. Id.
136. PODZIBA, supra note 130, at 39.
137. Id. at 37-38.
138. Id. at 40.
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among fishers regarding marine mammal "hot spots" (areas of high marine
mammal concentration); (8) researching new means to standardized gear
modifications; (9) developing a buy-out program to reduce effort in the
fishery, by allowing fishermen to sell their allocation of sets to other
driftnetters or non-fishers.
39
For the longline fishery only, AOCTRT-recommended strategies
included: (1) limiting length-of-gear of pelagic longlines to 24 nautical
miles from August through November in the Mid-Atlantic Bight; (2)
reducing maximum soak-time in the Mid-Atlantic Bight during August
through November by hauling out gear in the order it was set; (3) requiring
that longliners move after one entanglement with a marine mammal; (4)
conducting research on modification of gear and/or operating practices,
cetacean behavior, and acoustical systems to devise ways to reduce
entanglement; (5) increasing observer coverage in the longline fishery to
10 percent in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast Coastal areas from August
through November, and at least 5 percent in the rest of the fishery; (6)
developing a stratified random sampling scheme for the longline fishery to
increase precision of bycatch estimates and insure optimal allocation of
observer coverage.t40
For the pair trawl fishery, AOCTRT recommended: (1) qualifying and
certifying operators; (2) certifying nets; (3) researching cetacean behavior
and target species; and (4) developing industry performance standards and
review protocols.' 4' In September 1996, prior to the completion and
submission of the plan, NMFS denied the pair trawl fishery's petition for
rulemaking to authorize the use of pair trawl gear in the Atlantic tuna
fishery.44 Because pair trawl gear is not currently authorized for fishing
in the Atlantic tuna or swordfish fishery, the team's recommendations for
this fishery were not implemented.4 3
139. November Regulations, supra note 130, at 59,657; see PODZIBA, supra note 130,
at 45-46.
140. PODZIBA, supra note 130, at 49.
141. Id. at 42-44.
142. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND REGULATORY IMPACr REVIEW ON
ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ATLANTIC OFFSHORE CETACEAN TAKE
REDUCTION PLAN. (National Marine Fisheries Service, Office of Protected Resources and
Office of Sustanable Fisheries) 2 (1997) [hereinafter Draft Environmental Assessment].
143. Id.
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3. Evaluation of the AOCTRT
The AOCTRT submitted to NMFS the Atlantic Offshore Cetacean
Take Reduction Plan on November 25, 1996.'4 According to the MMPA,
NMFS should have published a proposed rule and implementing regula-
tions by January 25, 1997.45 Originally the closure was designated for the
period of December 1, 1996 through May 29, 1997, and was for the
northern portion of the Atlantic swordfish driftnet fishery, pursuant to
section 305(c) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Management
Act, but on June 5, 1997, NMFS's failure to meet this deadline resulted in
the extension of the emergency closure until November 26, 1997.146 In
November of 1997, NMFS published a draft Environmental Assessment
(EA) for the Atlantic Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Plan. 147 This EA
questioned whether the AOCTRT's consensus plan would provide
sufficient protection for right whales or other cetaceans. '48 In accordance
with the MMPA, NMFS proposed another alternative that it believed would
achieve the goals of the MMPA and the ESA.'49 This alternative had been
discussed during the course of the take reduction team's negotiation, but
was rejected. The Center for Marine Conservation (CMC) supported the
NMFS alternative in its formal comment. 150 However, though CMC
endorsed the end result, it did not approve of the method of arriving at the
alternative. NMFS participants should have voiced their concerns and
proposed these alternative take reduction strategies during the AOCTRT
negotiations. Because NMFS circumvented the proper communication
channel and delayed the implementation of the plan it undermined the
entire take reduction process and at the same time its delays allowed the
fishery to operate without the benefit of a take reduction plan, resulting in
the kill of hundreds of marine mammals.
Finally, after conducting a comprehensive review of the swordfish
fishery, NMFS published a final rule prohibiting the use of driftnet gear in
144. November Regulations, supra note 130, at 59,657.
145. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(f)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
146. Atlantic Swordfish Fishery; Extension of Drift Gillnet Emergency Closure, 62 Fed.
Reg. 30,775 (June 5, 1997).
147. November Regulations, supra note 130, at 59,657.
148. Id.
149. Id.; Draft Environmental Assessment, supra note 142, at 18-21.
150. CENTER FOR MARINE CONSERVATION, COMMENTOFTHEON THE TAKING OFMARINE
MAMMALS INCIDENTAL TO COMMERCIAL FISHING OPERATIONS; ATLANTIC OFFSHORE
CETACEAN TAKE REDUCTION PLAN ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,657-58,
at 3-6 (Dec. 31, 1997).
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the North Atlantic swordfish fishery.' With two of the three fisheries
closed, NMFS now focused on the longline fishery. As of 1999, many of
the AOCTRT recommendations for take reduction in the longline fishery
were being implemented as part of the Highly Migratory Species Fishery
Management Plan 52 under the Office of Sustainable Fisheries instead of
under the MMPA and the Office of Protected Resources. In the author's
opinion this adjustment of protocol violated the intent of the MMPA and
represents yet another failure by NMFS to give the take reduction team
process its proper regard. To date, NMFS has not proposed a take reduction
plan for the non-regulatory aspects of the longline fishery nor has NMFS
convened the AOCTRT since the take reduction plan was submitted.
In summary, the AOCTRT was a failure, even though it reached
consensus, solely because NMFS severely undermined the good faith
efforts of the AOCTRT at every turn by: (1) closing the pair trawl fishery
during the course of the negotiations; (2) failing to raise concerns about the
ability of the consensus plan to achieve PBR during the negotiation process
rather than after the process was completed; (3) raising the issue of the
need to address rare instances of incidental takes of endangered whales late
in the process, when there was insufficient time to address the issue; (4)
failing to implement a take reduction plan within the MMPA's timeframes
and violating the MMPA by allowing continued takes of marine mammals;
(5) ignoring the recommendations of the plan and using the MMPA to close
the drift gillnet fishery rather than the provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act; and (6) failing to implement fully the take reduction plan or reconvene
the AOCTRT in accordance with the MMPA. Two fisheries have been
closed, so the fate of the AOCTRT is uncertain. Equally uncertain is
whether the take reduction plan recommendations have achieved the goal
of reducing takes to PBR. One thing is certain, by closing these fisheries,
the Office of Sustainable Fisheries, demolished the very foundation of the
take reduction team negotiation process because the MMPA was not used
effectively, but was instead used as a tool to arbitrarily close fisheries--the
very action that this process is designed to avoid. If the AOCTRT has any
hope of being revived, implementation authority must be restored under the
MMPA and the Office of Protected Resources.
151. Atlantic Swordfish Fishery; Management of Driftnet Gear, 64 Fed. Reg. 4055
(proposed Jan. 27 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 630).
152. Atlantic Highly Migratory Species (HMS) Fisheries; Fishery Management Plan,
Plan Amendments, and Consolidation of Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 3159 (Jan. 20 1999).
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D. Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Team (ALWTRT)
1. Background on Large Whale Takes in the Atlantic
Based on data from 1991 through 1995, U.S. fishing gear [was]
estimated to be likely responsible for approximately 35 percent (six
events) of known human-caused serious injury and mortality to
right whales, while Canadian fisheries [were] estimated to be
responsible for 18 percent (three events); the remaining 47 percent
(eight events) was attributed to ship strikes.... NMFS estimate[d]
that a minimum of 1.2 right whales from the western North
Atlantic stock [were] seriously injured or killed annually by
entanglement in U.S. fishing gear.
53
For the most part, NMFS considered this a minimum estimate because
many entanglements go unobserved, occurring in areas where there is little
sighting effort.'54 NMFS's PBR for this stock was 0.4 right whales, the
target for any take reduction plan. 155 Therefore, "[ilf more than two serious
injuries or mortalities incidental to commercial fishing operations occur
within five years after the plan is promulgated," the plan will not achieve
its PBR goal.
15 6
In the 1996 Stock Assessment Reports, NMFS estimated "that rate of
serious injury and mortality of humpback whales due to fishery interactions
was 4.1 animals per year" and was therefore below the stock's PBR level
of 9.7.57 The 1996 Stock Assessment Reports indicated that over the
1991-1995 period, the total known fishery-related mortality and serious
injury rate for fin whales was less than 3.4 fin whales per year, well under
the PBR of 34 fin whales. 158 Likewise, NMFS estimated that "2.5 minke
153. Taking ofMarine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic
Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,519, 19,521 (April 7, 1997)
[to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 229) [hereinafter April Regulations]. NMFS estimated that:
lobster gear entangled an annual average of 0.4 whales over the last5 years; the Southeastern
U.S. drift gillnet fishery for sharks entangled an annual average of 0.2 whales over the same
period; the pelagic drift gillnet fishery was annually responsible for 0.4 fishery-induced
mortalities and serious injuries of right whales. The remaining known entanglements were
from unknown fisheries. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic
Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,157, 39,159 (Jul. 22, 1997)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 229) [hereinafter July Interim Rules].
158. Id. at39,159.
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whales are seriously injured or killed from fishery-related encounters. This
level did not exceed the PBR level of 21 for this stock." '159 Nevertheless,
because humpback and fin whales are endangered under the ESA and are
therefore considered strategic stocks under the MIVIPA, NMFS included
these species in the agenda for the ALWTRT.
2. The Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Team
"NMFS established the ALWTRT on August 6, 1996 to prepare a draft
Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan designed to reduce takes of
endangered humpback, fin, and right whales"'" in the South Atlantic shark
gillnet fishery, the Gulf of Maine and Mid-Atlantic lobster trap/pot fishery,
the Mid-Atlantic gillnet fishery, and the Gulf of Maine sink gillnet
fishery. 61 Although minke whales are not listed as strategic stock at this
time, the ALWTRT was also asked to consider measures that would reduce
takes of minke whales.
The ALWTRT included representatives of NMFS, the Marine Mammal
Commission, Maine Department of Marine Resources, Massachusetts
Division of Marine Fisheries, University of Rhode Island, Maryland
Department of Natural Resources, Virginia Marine Resources Commission,
North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries, Georgia Department of
Natural Resources, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, New
England Fishery Management Council, Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management
Council, environmental organizations, academic and scientific institutions,
and participants in the fisheries. 6 The ALWTRT met six times between
September 1996 through January 1997, submitting a report to NMFS on
February 5, 1997. However, the team did not reach consensus on all
aspects of the plan.'63
2.1 The Report of the ALWTRT
The ALWTRT's submitted report: (1) reviewed the status of affected
strategic marine mammal stocks; (2) described New England multispecies
sink gillnet fishery, the mid-Atlantic coastal gillnet fisheries, the Gulf of
Maine and U.S. mid-Atlantic lobster trap/pot fisheries, and the Southeast-
159. Id.
160. April Regulations, supra note 153, at 16,520.
161. Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Team Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,819 (Aug.
6, 1996).
162. Id. at40,821.
163. April Regulations, supra note 153, at 16,519.
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ern U.S. Atlantic drift gillnet fishery for sharks; (3) recommended potential
measures to reduce the bycatch of large whales; and (4) considered research
needs. 64 The ALWTRT's take reduction strategies included, among
others: (1) modifying fishing gear and practices, (2) imposing area
restrictions, (3) reducing inactive fishing gear and retrieving marine debris
consisting of lost or discarded gear, (4) implementing a gear marking
system to potentially identify the fishery and location of whale entangle-
ment, (5) using aggressive research to discover new gear modifications and
design, and (6) improving disentanglement efforts. 65 The ALWTRT also
recommended initiatives for fisher education and outreach, better monitor-
ing of the distribution of whale stocks and entanglements, joint initiatives
with Canada to reduce whale bycatch in commercial fisheries, and
exploration of market incentives to reduce large whale bycatch in these
fisheries. 166
While the ALWTRT agreed on many strategies, the team could not
reach consensus in two areas. The first dispute involved closing critical
habitat areas where low to moderate fishing effort was occurring, but where
there were also few sightings of right whales. 67  The second dispute
involved the location and type of gear modification requirements that
should be required. 68 Specifically, the consensus disintegrated over
whether to require the use of sinking groundlines in rocky bottom habitat.
2.2 NMFS Proposed Rule for the Take Reduction Plan
NMFS published the proposed rule to implement an Atlantic Large
Whale Take Reduction Plan on April 7, 1997 (60 days after the plan was
submitted). 169 The plan included seasonal fishery closures in times and
areas where right whales were known to occur, and a list of mandatory gear
modifications for gillnet and lobster fisheries, including using weak links,
reducing the breaking strength of buoy and ground lines, using more
sinking line, and anchoring requirements to increase the effectiveness of the
weak link. 7  The plan also included a gear marking system to help
determine the source of lines found on entangled whales; formation of a
164. ATLANTIC LARGE WHALE TAKE REDUCTION TEAM, DRAFr ATLANTIC LARGE WHALE
TAKE REDUCTION REPORT 38-77 (Feb 1, 1997).
165. Id.
166. Id.; see April Regulations, supra note 153, at 16,530.
167. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1997 18-19
(1998) [hereinafter 1997 Report].
168. Id.
169. April Regulations, supra note 153, at 16,519.
170. Id. at 16,520, 16,522-28.
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gear advisory group to aid in the identification and evaluation of various
research proposals; and expanded support for disentanglement teams.17'
In the proposed rule, NMFS greatly expanded the geographic area for
gear modification requirements to include waters, such as Maine state
waters, where few right whale sightings had been reported.'72 This action
"elicited strong opposition from thousands of New England fishermen, who
cited concern about the costs of modifying gear" to fish in areas where right
whales were rarely seen.'7 3 All interest groups raised concerns over some
of NMFS's proposed gear modifications, such as 150-pound weak links,
because many of the modifications were untested for take reduction
efficacy and some believed that the prescription may have been
premature. 74
The issue quickly became both highly polarized and politicized. NMFS
received over 13,000 comments (including form letters, postcards and
signatures on petitions) from state and federal agencies, congressional
offices, state legislature representatives, towns, conservation groups,
industry associations, businesses, fishers and other private individuals.'7 1
In addition, NMFS received oral testimony at twelve public hearings held
from Maine through Virginia. 1
76
2.3 NMFS Interim Final Rule on the Take Reduction Plan
On July 22, 1997, NMFS published the interim final rule to implement
the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan.'77 NMFS substantially
revised the interim final rule from the proposed rule.'78 In the interim rule,
NMFS required all lobster and sink gillnet gear to be rigged so that the
buoy line did not float at the surface of the water at any time. 179 The
interim rule also prohibited 'wet storage' of lobster gear, which is the
practice of leaving unbaited traps in the water rather than storing them on
land.' Further, NMFS shrunk the geographic area for which the gear
modifications applied, removed the modification requirements for gear
deployed in coves and harbors, and created a menu option that allowed
171. Id. at 16,528-31.
172. ld at 16,526.
173. 1997 Report, supra note 167, at 20.
174. Id. at 19.
175. July Interim Rules, supra note 157, at 39,166.
176 Id.
177. Id. at 39,157.
178. Id. at 69,164.
179. d
180. Id. at39,162.
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fishers to choose certain gear modifications to reduce the injury or
mortality risks for entangled marine mammals.' 8 ' For example, at least one
modification from a list of acceptable options was to be used if the gear
was set in areas whales rarely use, and at least two of the modifications
were required if the gear was set in areas of more frequent whale use.1
82
Additionally, there were more specific requirements for gear allowed in
areas that had previously been declared "critical habitat" for right whales;
critical habitat areas off Massachusetts, Georgia, and Florida were closed
to some gear during times when whales were known to aggregate.'83
2.4 Problems with the Interim Final Rule
In the opinion of the environmental community, the interim final rule
for the Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan significantly weakened
the proposed rule because the gear (menu) options list required a greater
reliance on a gear technology list to implement the plan which, in most
cases, provided no meaningful risk reduction for marine mammal entangle-
ment and, in fact, did not depart from the normal fishing practices that had
entangled whales.'84 In the summaries provided in Tables 4 and 5, it is
clear that the interim final rule for both lobster and gillnet gear, requiring
only two gear options for areas such as Cape Cod Bay, Great South
Channel, and Stellwagen Bank/Jeffreys Ledge, was considerably less
restrictive than the strategies recommended by either the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts Endangered Whale Working Group (CMEWWG) in its
Conservation Plan for Massachusetts Waters to Minimize Entanglement
Risk for Right Whales for Cape Cod Bay, the ALWTRT's report, or the
fishing industry in its Industry-State Agency Large Whale Take Reduction
Plan (see tables 4 and 5). Most of these plans proposed using four or more
gear technology restrictions; smaller diameter line (5/16 in.); and reduced
breaking strength (< 1,100 lb.). In addition, NMFS significantly weakened
the take reduction strategies for the Mid-Atlantic anchored gillnet fisheries
181. Id. at39,161.
182. Id.
183. Id. at39,161-62.
184. NMFS usurped the authority of the ALWTRT by creating a competing body in the
Gear Advisory Group, a free-standing body which contained no representation from the
conservation community and reported directly to the Regional Administrator rather than the
ALWTRT. NMFS consulted with this team during the comment period on the proposed
rule, and because NMFS did not require that the recommendations from the Gear Advisory
Group be reviewed by the ALWTRT, the gear modifications recommended by this group and
incorporated into the interim rule, were substantially weaker than those recommended by the
ALWTRT.
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because the take reduction strategy only required one gear modification.
This strategy was a complete departure from the consensus strategy
proposed by the ALWTRT report.
At the same time that NMFS's proposed actions that represented no
real risk reduction, it removed other requirements to provide important data
and information that were included in the ALWTRT report. For example,
NMFS's prohibition of floating line at the water surface did not result in
any meaningful risk reduction because standard fishing practices typically
did not result in line floating at the surface. The same was true with the
prohibition on "wet storage"; as written, fishers could potentially stow gear
in the water so long as he/she "hauled it out of the water at least once in 30
days.' The letter of the law was satisfied while the neglected gear
continued to threaten whales with entanglement. On the other hand, NMFS
removed the ALWTRT requirement to mark/color code gear by region and
gear type, thereby decreasing the utility of the data designed to aid in
pinpointing areas and fisheries where whales encounter gear.16 Finally,
NMFS removed all contingency measures to extend gear requirements or
to close a restricted area in the event of anomalous right whale
distribution.8 7 NMFS did not replace these contingency measures with any
early warning mechanisms to notify the commercial fishing fleets of
unexpected right whale presence.
Table 4. Summary of the Various Proposed Take Reduction Strate-
gies for Cape Cod Bay Critical Habitat and the Areas Adjacent to or
West of Cape Cod Bay Critical Habitat
INDUSTRY PRO- TAKE REDUC- PROPOSED INTERIM FINAL
POSAL"' TION PLAN" 9  RULE RULE
Lobster Gear Lobster Gear Lobster Gear: Lobster Gear
Other Restrict Pe- Other Restrict Pe- Other Restrict Pe- Other Restrict Pe-
riod: riod: riod: riod:'
May 16-Dec. 31 May 16-Dec. 31 May 16-Dec. 31 May 16-Dec. 31
185. July Interim Rules, supra note 157, at 39,185.
186. Id. at39,165.
187. Id. at 39,165-66.
188. Industry proposal as presented in Industry-State Agency Large Whale Take
Reduction Plan. Implementation as presented for January 1, 1998.
189. The ALWTRT Team Report was designed to implement the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts Conservation Plan for Massachusetts Waters to Minimize Entanglement Risk
for Right Whales (State Plan); however, since the submission of that report, the State Plan
has been modified to require restrictions from Jan. 1 - May 7, no single pot trawls, sinking
groundlines, modified sinking buoy lines with the bottom 1/3 floating line, and weak link
below the buoy.
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Limit on buoy
lines--no more
than one buoy line
is used per trawl
consisting of fewer
than four pots and
no more than two
buoy lines used
per trawl consist-
ing of four or more
pots.
Sinking buoy Sinking buoy Sinking or modi- Asinking buoy
lines--all buoy lines--all buoy fied sinking buoy lines-all buoy
lines are sinking lines are sinking, lines90  lines are composed
except for the bot- entirely of sinking
tom 1/3. line
Weak line or Weak link or Breakaway All buoys are at-
break-away at or break-away at or buoys 9' or weak tached to the buoy
just below the just below the buoy lines 92  line with a weak
buoy in all lines buoy in all lines (breaking strength link having a max.
(recommended 150 lb.). breaking strength
breaking of up to 1,100 lbs.
strength- 150 Weak links may
lbs.). include swivel,
plastic weak links,
rope of appropri-
ate breaking
strength, hob
rings, or rope sta-
pled to a buoy
stick.
Sinking Sinking Sinking Sinking
groundlines-All groundlines-AI1 groundlines-AIl groundlines-AII
lines are sinking lines are sinking lines are sinking lines are sinking
line. line. line. line.
190. The floating line is not attached to the buoy, is used only in the bottom-most section
of the buoy line, and is not longer than 10 percent of the depth of the water at mean low
water; the floating line is not larger than '/2 inch in diameter; and the floating line is attached
to the sinking line by a splice, not by a knot.
191. The buoy line is attached at the top of the line to a breakaway buoy of breaking
strength no more than 150 pounds.
192. The buoy line has a weak buoy line that is at least as long as the depth of the water
at mean high water, is attached to the buoy at the top of the line, and is attached to a
functional buoy line at the bottom, the weak buoy line must have a breaking strength no
greater than 150 pounds.
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193. In the interim final rule, NMFS states that, "... although portions of the Great
South Channel critical habitat would be considered offshore, NMFS believes that the weaker
maximum breaking strengths allowed for inshore gear are more appropriate in the critical
habitat, since right whales may return to the area when not expected. Therefore, the Great
South Channel critical habitat is not considered 'offshore' for the purposes of this plan."
July Interim Rules, supra note 157, at 39,163. CMC supported this position.
194. The floating line is not attached to the buoy, is used only in the bottom most section
of the buoy line, and is not longer than 10 percent of the depth of the water at mean low
water; the floating line is not larger than V2 inch in diameter; and the floating line is attached
to the sinking line by a splice and not by a knot.
Table 5. Summary of the Various Proposed Take Reduction Strategies
for the Great South Channel Critical Habitat's Other Restricted Period
INDUSTRY PRO- TAKE REDUC- PROPOSED INTERIM FINAL
POSAL TION PLAN RULE RULE
Lobster Gear Lobster Gear Lobster Gear: Lobster Gear
Other Restricted Other Restrict Pe- Other Restrict Pe- Other Restricted
Period: riod: riod: Period:
Jul. 16-Mar. 31 Jul. 16-Mar. 31 Jul. 1-Mar. 31 Jul. 1-Mar. 31 At
least TWO charac-
NO teristics from the
PROPOSALS Gear Technology
List must be
used.93
Limit on buoy All buoy lines are
lines-no more 7/16 inches in di-
than one buoy line ameter or less.
is used per trawl
consisting of fewer
than four pots and
no more than two
buoy lines used
per trawl consist-
ing of four or more
pots.
Sinking buoy lines Sinking or modi- Sinking buoy
except for the last fled sinking buoy lines-all buoy
10 fathoms, which lines." 4  lines are composed
may be up to /2 entirely of sinking
inch floating rope, line
spliced in to pre-
vent formation of
a knot.
20011
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Weak line at or
just below the
buoy in all buoy
lines.
Breakaway
buoys 95 or weak
buoy lines
96
(breaking strength
150 lb.).
All buoys are at-
tached to the buoy
line with a weak
link having a max.
breaking strength
of up to 1,100 lbs.
Weak links may
include swivel,
plastic weak links,
rope of appropri-
ate breaking
strength, hob
rings, or rope sta-
pled to a buoy
stick.
Sinking Sinking
groundlines-All groundlines-All
groundlines are groundlines are
sinking line. sinking line.
The conservationists' concerns about the plan were well-founded.
During 1998, under the regime of the interim final rule, two right whales
were entangled. One was seen entangled in unidentified gear in the Bay of
Fundy and another was entangled and disentangled on two occasions in
lobster gear in Cape Cod Bay.' 97
2.5 Modifications to the Interim Final Rule and the Final Rule
On February 7 and 8, 1999, NMFS reconvened the ALWTRT. Despite
the lack of consensus, disillusionment with the process, and the divisive
dialog that occurred during the proposed and interim rules, the ALWTRT
was, nevertheless, able to formulate several consensus recommendations
concerning gear marking requirements and anchoring provisions.'98
195. The buoy line is attached at the top of the line to a breakaway buoy of breaking
strength no more than 150 pounds.
196. The buoy line has a weak buoy line that is at least as long as the depth of the water
at mean high water, is attached to the buoy at the top of the line, and is attached to a
functional buoy line at the bottom, the weak buoy line must have a breaking strength no
greater than 150 pounds.
197. 1999 Report, supra note 118, at 20.
198. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic
Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 7529 (Feb. 16, 1999).
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NMFS published the final rule on February 16, 1999 with an effective
date of April 1, 1999.199 On April 9, 1999, NMFS published a final rule
with a partial stay concerning the final rule's gear marking regulations until
November 1, 1999, or until a better system is designed.2" The other
recommendations from the ALWTRT's February 1999 meeting were
largely ignored.
In the spring of 1999, six right whale entanglements were confirmed,
with one right whale entangled in gillnet gear dying.2°' This information
clearly indicated that the take reduction plan was not meeting its goal of
reducing entanglement, serious injury, or mortality of right whales.
Therefore, in February, April, and May of 2000, the ALWTRT met to
revise the plan. 2 The team has tentatively agreed to additional gear
modifications and has done away with the menu options approach,
requiring instead, several modifications for fisheries both in and adjacent
to critical habitat.2 3 The ALWTRT also discussed, but did not reach a
consensus, several options for dynamic area management as a tool to
reduce whale/gear interactions, in such areas as the Great South Channel,
Cape Cod Bay, Jeffreys Ledge, and Stellwagen Bank.2" NMFS published
regulations in December of 2000 and is in the process of revising the take
reduction plan with the intent of publishing regulations to address the
dynamic management options for the northeast and further modifications
to the regulations for the Mid-Atlantic and the Southeast in the summer
2001.205
2.6 Right Whale Litigation
In Strahan v. Linnon 06 the plaintiff alleged in an amended complaint,
filed in June 1996, that NMFS failed to establish take reduction teams or
implement take reduction plans for right whales and other whale species
within the mandated timeframes and that NMFS improperly refrained from
199. Id
200. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic
Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,292 (April 9, 1999).
201. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic
Large Whale Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,368 (Dec. 21, 2000).
202. Id. at 80,369.
203. Id. at 80,374-75.
204. Id.
205. RESOLVE CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DIsPuTE RESOLUTION, MEETING
SUMMARY OFTHE ATLANTIC LARGE WHALE TAKE REDUCTION TEAM (August 22, 2000).
206. Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581,590-91 (D. Mass. 1997), aft'd, 187 F.3d 623
(lst Cir. 1998); 1997 Report, supra note 167, at 21.
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classifying the New England lobster fishery under Category I on its list of
fisheries.20 7 On August 30, 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction, claiming that the government had failed to develop
a large whale take reduction plan. 2 8 NMFS indicated that the agency
would issue a draft plan by April 1, 1997, and a final plan by July 15,
1997.209 Consequently, with those assurances, the court denied the motion
for an injunction.2"0
In another lawsuit, Strahan v. Coxe, 1 the plaintiff alleged that
Massachusetts's licensing of gillnet and lobster fishing in state waters was
a violation of the ESA and the MMPA, and that allowing the use of such
gear in critical habitat is an impermissible modification of that habitat
22
The court granted the plaintiff partial relief and instructed the state to: (1)
apply for incidental take permits under the MMPA and the ESA; (2)
develop and submit a proposal to restrict, modify, or eliminate the use of
fixed fishing gear in coastal waters of Massachusetts listed as right whale
critical habitat; and (3) convene a working group on endangered whales to
discuss modifications to fishing gear and other measures to minimize the
harm to such whales.2 13 The team was convened and a plan was developed
in response to the court order, many of the provisions of that plan were
included in the final take reduction plan.
3. Evaluation of the ALWTRT
It was unfortunate that the ALWTRT failed to reach consensus;
perhaps if more time were available for additional negotiations and the
ALWTRT did not have the added pressure of both state and federal
lawsuits, consensus may have been reached. On the other hand, NMFS
failed to take advantage of the ALWTRT's substantive and political
progress and the level of agreement that was achieved on many issues,
including some take reduction strategies. Instead, NMFS proposed an
initial regulation that was too restrictive in some areas such as Maine state
waters, and an interim version that lacked sufficient conservation and risk
reduction. With the pendulum swinging from one extreme to the other,
207. Id.
208. 1997 Report, supra note 167, at 21.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied 525 U.S. 830
(1998), cert. denied sub nom Coates v. Strahan, 525 U.S. 978 (1998).
212. Id.; 1997 Report, supra note 167, at 22.
213. Id.
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NMFS failed to achieve any real conservation measures for right whales or
any other whale species in the Atlantic.
The CMC and most of the fishing industry participants recommended
repeatedly that NMFS focus limited enforcement resources and mitigation
strategies on those areas where there is the greatest potential for interaction
with whales; areas outside already-designated and restricted critical habitat,
such as Stellwagen Bank and Jeffreys Ledge (not Maine state waters).1 4
These high-risk areas should receive the majority of gear modification
requirements. Two years later ALWTRT is proposing exactly these types
of recommendations. Moreover, the many members of the ALWTRT
agreed that if data analysis shows large whale entanglement increasing
and/or further action is needed to meet the goals of the MMPA, tested and
refined gear modifications could be used in areas other than the Gulf of
Maine (e.g. Maine State waters). For the present, however, the priority
should be to aggressively research and field test gear modifications that will
eliminate the risk of entanglement for whales.
It is extremely unfortunate that NMFS failed to consider the progress
made in the take reduction team process, because the commonalities were
many between environmentalists and fishers and instead of being over-
looked they should have been fostered, thus allowing NMFS to avert the
political interventions, volatile discourse, and explosive reactions from all
members of the ALWTRT and public. The harsh reality is that NMFS' s
proposal fueled the communication breakdown within the ALWTRT
resulting from the team's failure to reach consensus. For example, some
members joined the press in generating rumors and half-truths by
mischaracterizing the position of various organizations and individuals and
questioning the motives of these individuals. 215 NMFS did a disservice to
both the conservation community and the fishing industry. Proposals
developed over six months of negotiations and the ALWTRT's 1999
recommendations were completely ignored. Fragile goodwill, so hard-won
between the environmental community, fishing industry, and the federal
and state governments, vanished. The NMFS interim rule merely
postponed needed gear regulations on Stellwagen and Jeffreys Ledge,
causing whales to become entangled, injured, and killed as a direct result
in 1998, 1999, and 2000. Nevertheless, the environmental community and
214. Comments from CMC to Michael Payne, Chief, Marine Mammal Division of the
National Marine Fisheries Service on the Proposed rule for the Atlantic Large Whale Take
Reduction Plan. See also Letters from Center for Marine Conservation to the Editor (May
1, 1997) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
215. National Fisherman Letter to the Editor regarding CMC's position on the Take
Reduction Plan; see also Letter from CMC to the Editor (Aug. 13, 1997) (on file with the
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
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the fishing industry must hold onto the last fragile hope that, despite NMFS
actions, the ALWTRT can still function and devise consensus recommen-
dations.
Table 6. 1995 Marine Mammal Stock Assessment - Strategic Stocks
with Fishery Interactions
SPECIES/STOCK PBR ANN. FISHERY SOURCES OF
FISHERY MORTALITY
MOR-
TALITY
Humpback Whale/ 0.5 >0.5 CA/OR Drift gillnet Fishery
California-Mexico
Sperm Whale/ CA to WA 1.0 17 CA/OR Drift gillnet Fishery
Baird's Beaked Whale/CA, 0.2 >0.15 CA/OR Drift gillnet Fishery
OR, WA
Pygmy sperm whale/ CA, 4.8 5.7 CA/OR Drift gillnet Fishery
OR, WA
Cuvier's beaked whale/ CA, 8.9 24 CA/OR Drift gillnet Fishery
OR, WA
Mesoplodont beaked whale/ 1.4 7.7 CA/OR Drift gillnet Fishery
CA, OR, WA
Minke whale/ CA/WA/OR 2.6 0.5 CA/OR Drift gillnet Fishery
E. Pacific Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team (POCTRT)
1. Background of Marine Mammal Takes in the Pacific Fisheries
The California/Oregon drift gillnet fishery has an historical incidental
bycatch of several strategic marine mammal stocks, including several
beaked whale species, short-finned pilot whales, pygmy sperm whales,
sperm whales, and humpback whales.21 6 The California/Oregon drift gillnet
(CA/OR DGN) fishery for thresher shark and swordfish is classified as a
216. JAY BARLOW ET AL, NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, U.S. PACIFIC MARINE
MAMMAL STOCK ASSESsMENTS (1995).
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Category I fishery under section 118 of the MMPA.217 It "is a pelagic
fishery, with the majority of the fishing effort occurring within 200 miles
(320 kilometers) offshore of California and Oregon."2' 8
2. Pacific Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team
NMFS established the Pacific Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team
(PCTRT) on February 13-14, 1996, to prepare a draft take reduction
plan.219 'The PCTRT included representatives of NMFS, the California
Department of Fish and Game (CDFG), the Pacific States Marine Fisheries
Commission, environmental organizations, academic and scientific
organizations, and participants in the CA/OR DGN fishery. In selecting
these team members, NMFS sought an equitable balance among representa-
tives of resource user and non-user interests."22
The PCTRT was tasked with developing a consensus plan for reducing
incidental mortality and serious injury of strategic marine mammal stocks
of beaked whales, pilot whales, pygmy sperm whales, sperm whales, and
humpback whales in the CA/OR DGN fishery.22 1 "The PCTRT met five
times between February and June 1996 and submitted a consensus draft
plan to NMFS on August 15, 1996. "222
The take reduction plan relies on four primary strategies, with a strong
contingency section in the event these strategies fail.223 The PCTRT
proposed regulations to implement three of these primary strategies, which
included establishing a depth of fishing requirement, using acoustic
deterrent devices (pingers), and requiring skipper workshops.2 24 The
PCTRT recommended implementation of another primary strategy by
NMFS, through a vehicle other than federal regulation. NMFS was to
encourage California Department Fish and Game (CDFG) "not to reissue
lapsed permits, and to encourage the Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife (ODFW) to continue issuing the same number of permits. 225
217. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Operations; Pacific Offshore
Cetacean Take Reduction Plan Reductions, 62 Fed. Reg. 6931 (Feb. 14, 1997) [hereinafter
February Regulations].
218. Id.
219. Pacific Offshore Fisheries Take Reduction Team Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 5385
(1996).
220. February Regulations, supra note 217, at 6931.
221. Id
222. Id
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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"The PCTRT recommended that NMFS establish a fleet wide 16
fathom (36 feet or 10.9 meters) minimum extender line length requirement.
Extender lines attach buoys (floats) to the drift gillnet's floatline and
determine the depth of the water column at which the net is fished." '226
Based on the analysis of NMFS' observer data for the CA/OR DGN fishery
from 1990 to 1995, the PCTRT noted that the majority of the cetaceans
incidentally taken were observed entangled in the upper third of the net and
a significantly greater number of cetaceans were caught during net sets that
were shallower--using extenders that are less than 6 fathoms (10.9 m) deep;
therefore, lowering nets in the water column was expected toill likely
significantly reduce the incidental bycatch of cetaceans. 27
"The PCTRT recommended that NMFS conduct mandatory skipper
workshops on the components of the PCTRP, together with expert skipper
panels, to further generate and consider potential, additional take reduction
strategies. '  Workshops were to provide drift gillnet skippers with
information relevant to the development history of the take reduction plan,
the components of the plan, plan implementation, species identification
information, and methods to avoid marine mammal entanglement.2 29 All
CA/OR DGN vessel operators were to attend one Skipper Education
Workshop before fishing in the 1997/98 fishing season (May 1 to Dec.
31).230 Finally, the workshops were to solicit feedback from fishers on
methods to successfully reduce marine mammal interactions.2 3'
"The POCTRT recommended that NMFS and the CA/OR DGN fishery
initiate an acoustic deterrent device (pinger) experiment in the fishery
during the 1996-97 fishing season to evaluate the effectiveness of pingers
at reducing incidental cetacean and strategic stock bycatch. ' '232 If experi-
mental results indicated a reduction in cetacean bycatch, then the PCTRT
recommended that NMFS require mandatory fleet-wide pinger use for all
CA/OR DGN fishery vessels prior to the next fishing season (1997-98).233
226. Id. at 6932.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. "[A] workshop of cetacean and acoustic experts concluded that a pinger
experiment should be conducted in the CA/OR DGN fishery to test its effectiveness at
reducing cetacean entanglement. The workshop participants recommended that the pingers
used in the New England sink gillnet fishery (10 kHz at 132 dB re 1<#I> Pa at 1 meter) be
used experimentally in the CA/OR DGN fishery because the sound frequency of the pingers
was within the hearing sensitivity of most of the cetaceans that interact with that fishery."
Id.
233. Id.
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"NMFS and the CA/OR DGN fishery initiated a pinger experiment in the
CA/OR DGN fishery in August 1996."" Pingers used were of the same
sound frequency, level, pulse duration, and rate as those used in the New
England sink gillnet fishery. The results indicated that observed cetacean
entanglement rate was almost 4 times greater for non-pinger sets than
pinger sets."5
Finally, the take reduction plan also included:
(1) a review of the current information on the status of the affected
strategic marine mammal stocks; (2) a description of the CA/OR
DGN fishery; (3) an analysis of data from NMFS's CA/OR DGN
fishery observer program from 1990-1995; (4) primary strategies
to reduce takes of strategic marine mammal stocks; (5) contingency
measures that would reduce fishing effort; and (6) other recom-
mendations regarding voluntary measures to reduce takes, enhance
the effectiveness of the observer program, research on oceano-
graphic/environmental variables, and other potential strategies
considered and rejected by the team. 1 6
The plan also contained language on operating procedures to use as
contingency measures if takes continue to exceed PBR levels. 237
3. Evaluation of the POCTRT Process and Plan
The PCTRT submitted its plan on August 15, 1996, and NMFS
published the proposed rule to implement the plan on February 14, 1997,
six months after submission. On October 3, 1997, NMFS published the
final rule to implement the plan, effective October 30, 1997, requiring that
the top of the nets be set at a minimum depth of thirty-six feet below the
water surface, that pingers 38 be used on all nets, that the states of Califor-
234. Id.
235. ld.
236. Final Rule, Pacific Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 62 Fed.
Reg. 51,805 (Oct. 3, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 229).
237. ad "If... the [take reduction plan] objectives have not been met, the [take
reduction team] will evaluate and recommend methods to reduce fishing effort in the
upcoming season .... ." Id. at 51,808.
238. "Under this rule, [NMFS-approved] pingers must be used on all vessels, during
every set, and during the entire fishing season. A [NMFS-approved] pinger is an acoustic
deterrent device which, when immersed in water, broadcasts a sound frequency range of
approximately 10 to 80 kHz at 132 dB re I micropascal at I m with a pulse duration of 300
milliseconds and a pulse rate of 4 seconds." Id. at 51,810.
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nia and Oregon reduce the number of "inactive" permittees, and that vessel
operators be required to attend educational workshops regarding marine
mammals and the take reduction plan.239
In the 1997/1998 fishing season, marine mammal incidental mortality
was reduced by sixty-five percent.240 At the PCTRT's recommendation,
NMFS published an interim final rule on January 22, 1999, which modified
specifications to allow for longer attachment lanyards to achieve safer
deployment of pingers.24' In 1999, the PCTRT met and again found that the
marine mammal mortality had declined in the 1998/1999 fishing season,
although one sperm whale was reported killed.2 42  "[Tihis mortality
occurred in a set where the required number of pingers had not been
deployed."2
43
In May 2000, the PCTRT met and reviewed the data for the 1999-2000
fishing season, which "indicate[d] that the entanglement of Cetaceans has
increased in comparison to the prior seasons since the mandatory use of
pingers.... 4. "The increase in takes was particularly notable in the months
of December 1999 and January 2000. '2'45 Although the take of species
addressed by the take reduction plan remains below PBR and take is below
ten percent of PBR (the current proposed definition of ZMRG) for all but
three species, the PCTRT, concerned about the increase in take, recom-
mended a package of measures for the next fishing seasons with the goal
of addressing some of the potential causes for a possible trend that has been
identified and obtaining additional data to assist in its analysis of appropri-
ate recommendations. 6 These recommendations included:
" NMFS continue to require that fishers utilize a 36' extender in
accordance with the final rule and technical amendment;
o NMFS continue to require fishers to use pingers on both the lead
line and float line;
o NMFS and the industry conduct "research and development" on
an alternative pinger that would be attached to the net and left on
for the entire season;
239. Id. at 51,805-11.
240. 1999 Report, supra note 197, at 105.
241. Interim Final Rule, Pacific Offshore Cetation Take Reduction Plan Regulations, 64
Fed. Reg. 3431, 3432 (Jan. 22, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 229).
242. 1999 Report, supra note 197, at 105.
243. Id. at 36.
244. 2000 PACIFIC OFFSHORE CETACEANTAKE REDUCTION TEAM DRAFr RECOMMENDA-
TIONS REP. 1 (2000).
245. Id.
246. Id.
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* fishers convert to pingers that can be permanently attached to
the net when they become available;
" fishers check the operation of each pinger to ensure compliance
with the regulations for every set;
* appropriate state agencies continue not to re-issue permits that
have lapsed in California, and encourage the continuation of the
same level of permits issued by Oregon;
* NMFS continue to conduct mandatory Skipper Education
Workshops247 during September of this fishing season and
continue this policy annually;
* fishers avoid setting in areas of high sightings and entangle-
ments and establish a real-time communication system regarding
sightings and entanglements;
" NMFS conduct timely abundance surveys;
" Observers check the functioning of pingers (whether they are
on or off) and record their findings on the data form and if a
mammal entanglement occurs, observers should record wheth-
er the pingers in the area adjacent to the take are working;
* NMFS should provide a tester for the observers to utilize; and
• NMFS implement an aggressive program of at-sea boardings in
cooperation with CDFG and the US Coast Guard be imple-
mented to enforce the Take Plan regulations.24
Overall, the PCTRT functioned smoothly, and the plan was nearly
implemented within the time frame required by the MIMPA. This is the
only team that achieved its goal of reaching PBR. Reasons for this success
were varied. For one, both regional and headquarter NMFS staff consid-
ered plan implementation under the authority of the MMPA a high priority.
As such the plan required no further action by a fishery management
council. Strong and timely modeling and analysis efforts by the NMFS
scientific staff were also key, as well as the fact that the fishery was
247. "Workshops should include the following topics: information on the number of
entanglements observed in the 1999-2000 season and the late season trend of increased
entanglements; an update on the new pinger product options; new observer data collection
efforts regarding the functioning of pingers; approaches for testing pinger efficacy;
information from the Southwest Center regarding the correlation between sightings of
marine mammals and entanglements and how to integrate this into fishing practices;
approaches for establishing a real-time communication system among members of the fleet
with respect to sightings and entanglements; potential relationship between sightings and
water color, particularly for greener water (concentrations of chlorophyll); fisher feedback
to improve current strategies and to evaluate possible additional strategies; [and] NMFS
policy regarding enforcement of the regulations." Id. at 3.
248. IL at 1-5.
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minimally burdened by closures and restrictions in comparison to other
fisheries. The team was small, open, and willing to accept scientific
premises and work toward consensus; consequently, these factors
contributed to the group's achieving their goals. Finally, NMFS's science
staff quickly conducted the necessary experiments to support the research
needs of the plan. This mix of commitment to the process and its imple-
mentation at all levels, along with the willingness to accept the data and
actively engage in the process, is the keystone to success in the take
reduction team process.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS OF THE
TAKE REDUCTION TEAM PROCESS
A. Survey of the Take Reduction Team Process
In the fall of 1998, RESOLVE, a dispute resolution firm contracted by
NMFS to facilitate the take reduction teams, surveyed take reduction team
members to solicit feedback on the negotiation phase of the take reduction
team process. The goal of the survey was to evaluate the take reduction
team process for each of the five teams, to provide team members with an
opportunity to express their interests and concerns about the negotiation
process, and to assist NMFS in improving its future multi-party negotiation
processes.
In summary, the results of the survey indicated that:
o Most respondents felt the process is effective in resource
management decision-making. (eighty-six percent of respon-
dents)
" Most respondents felt that the negotiation process was fair.
(seventy-eight percent)
o Most respondents felt that there was adequate time for the
overall negotiations. (sixty percent)
o Many participants were not satisfied with the results or the
outcome of the negotiation. (sixty percent)
" Most respondents felt that there was insufficient data to
support the negotiation. (sixty-eight percent)
B. The Role of the Facilitator
Through the take reduction team negotiation process, members were
able to learn more about the status of marine mammals and their interac-
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tions with commercial fisheries and the ecosystem than was previously
known. A process has begun by which resource managers, users of the
marine environment, and the public can develop relationships that lead to
better public policy. The use of a facilitator was a key reason that several
respondents experienced a sense of fairness in the negotiations. 249
During the take reduction team negotiations, the facilitator was
essential to identifying potential participants, achieving a representative
balance of interest groups, formulating a team, ° ensuring adherence to
ground rules, setting dates and places for meetings, keeping the group on
schedule, providing a means to keep discussions flowing and open to all
participants, collecting notes and materials, and circulating drafts of various
elements of emerging proposals. The facilitators were necessary to help
players get past conflicts and move through posturing to substance. As
talks progressed to increasingly difficult issues, the facilitator helped
identify obstacles and assisted the group in reaching critical
breakthroughs.2 ' The author recommends that NMFS continue to use
facilitators in the take reduction team process.
C. Commitment of Participants
The composition of the team and the authority of the NMFS staff
person at the take reduction team negotiations are critical. The success of
negotiations, particularly those requiring consensus, rely heavily on the
good faith efforts of the participants to actively negotiate and not arbitrarily
attempt to block consensus or the progress of the group. Therefore, it is
necessary to select participants who are fully prepared to support the
negotiation and consensus process, and to commit their organization to
implement the outcome. Facilitators have noted that participants will only
engage in multi-party negotiations if they believe that their particular
interests will be better promoted by building consensus rather than directly
lobbying their specific interests directly with the agency or Congress, or by
initiating lawsuits.2 2 For the most part, in all five of the take reduction
teams, representatives from industry and environmental organizations and
249. RESOLVE, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERv. TAKE REDUCTION TEAM
NEGOTIATION PROCESS EVALUATION 10 (1999).
250. Prior to the commencement of the negotiations it is important to identify and
determine whether all of the necessary interestgroups will be represented in the negotiations.
251. Telephone interview on September 16, 1996 with Abby Dilly, Vice President of the
Keystone Center, Washington, D.C.
252. Nina M. Young & Suzanne ludicello, Blueprint for Whale Conservation:
Implementing the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 149, 209
(1997).
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state managers negotiated in good faith and did their utmost to devise
consensus plans.
However, the RESOLVE report noted that the role of NMFS's staff
was not the same on all five take reduction teams, and sometimes the roles
of NMFS's staff changed over the course of the six-month negotiation. 3
During the process, it was expected that representatives have the ability to
speak on behalf of their organization, association, or agency. It was
apparent that NMFS's staff did not represent the senior management team
and did not have the authority to commit the agency to the consensus. 254
This inequity resulted in a significant amount of frustration with the
process after the conclusion of the negotiations and at the time of plan
publication. 5 Often, participants perceived that their recommendations
were not being considered or implemented as submitted because a NMFS
staff person with higher authority, who was not present at the negotiations,
significantly changed the team recommendation before publishing it for
public comment.256 Sometimes these changes were made in direct violation
of the MMPA because they contained little or no justification for the
change.
If the take reduction team process is to succeed and participants to
regain faith in NMFS decision makers, those staff with decision-making
authority must be present at the table, and they must actively engage in the
negotiation process.
D. Allowing Enough Time for Take Reduction Team Negotiations
While the survey indicated that sixty percent of respondents felt that
there was sufficient time for negotiations, one team stated that insufficient
time may have resulted in the failure of the team to reach consensus.
257
One of the benefits of the MMPA's six-month statutory time frame is that
it pushed players to achieve closure; however, two teams in particular, the
MATRT and the ALWTRT, could have benefitted from one additional
meeting.
Generally, the timelines specified by the MMPA should not be
changed. Time limits call for both the facilitator and negotiators to set
priorities and identify issues on which they are most likely to achieve
consensus early in the process. This then establishes a foundation whereby
253. RESOLVE, supra note 249, at 19.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. RESOLVE, supra note 249, at 12-13.
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the more contentious issues are tackled later in the process. It is important
to recognize, however, that difficult issues require sufficient time for
resolution, and any successful negotiation needs at least one opening
session where parties do little more than "posture" and stake out territory
before getting down to the business of compromise. In all situations, the
take reduction teams met at least four times over a period of several days.
The process requires a significant amount of time, and team members often
found themselves trying to reach consensus on issues or adopting draft take
reduction plans over the phone or by e-mail. Again, in the case of both the
ALWTRT and the MATRT, consensus may have been reached had there
been one additional meeting. The author recommends that NMFS work to
ensure sufficient time for deliberations and the development of a take
reduction plan. To the maximum extent possible, there should be one final
meeting where the plan is approved. In addition, it was the author's
experience that nearly every take reduction team has recommended that the
team meet during the public comment period for the proposed rule to
implement the plan. The teams have voiced that this meeting would be
critical to discuss changes or modify the plan, should unexpected issues
arise.
E. Improve the Data Needs and the Science
In the crafting of the 1994 amendments, the authors deliberately set out
to separate processes for scientific assessment from the regulatory regime
by creating two separate processes. Section 117 of the MMPA specifically
addressed stock assessments, independent peer-reviews of those assess-
ments, and consultations."8 The goal of this two-pronged approach was to
create greater confidence in the science upon which management measures
were based. 9 This objective has not been entirely fulfilled.
Approximately sixty-eight percent of the RESOLVE survey respon-
dents thought the data inadequate to support negotiations.2 ° The survey
indicated that government and environmental representatives were more
prone to accept the available data and interpretations than the fishing
community. 6' As noted in this manuscript, nearly every take reduction
team identified data gaps and recommended research to address these gaps.
Some members of the team were particularly skeptical about the methods
258. 16 U.S.C § 1386 (1994).
259. See Young, supra note 252, at 200.
260. RESOLVE, supra note 249, at 9.
261. RESOLVE, supra note 249, at 18-19.
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to derive PBR or stock abundance or bycatch estimates. 62 These doubts
generated heated debates regarding the necessary level of protection for
marine mammals. The success of the take reduction team deliberations is
strongly correlated to each group's ability to accept the underlying stock
assessments, bycatch estimates, and PBRs, even if they are 'imperfect'
science, and move forward to discuss conservation measures. Those teams
that were 'data rich' and put their trust and confidence in the ability of the
scientists to present and analyze data according to the best available
scientific methods fared best. Because the population abundance data,
bycatch estimate, observer data, and fishing effort data are central to the
success of both the development and implementation of the take reduction
plan, NMFS must make every attempt to acquire these data in a timely
fashion and present them to the team.
Despite these conflicts, the relationship between the take reduction
team and the scientific community can be mutually beneficial. Teams often
give valuable feedback to scientists by identifying gaps and recommending
research to fill these gaps in the take reduction plan. Also, scientific
participation is helpful in negotiations for several reasons. First, discus-
sions appeared to fare better when a person on the take team, who is either
perceived as unbiased or perhaps was part of regional scientific review
group, is present. Participation by scientists makes the scientific aspects of
the management process more credible to fishers.263 Second, scientists who
participated in consultations within the scientific review groups and
discussions within the take reduction teams are able to convey a better
understanding of calculation origins to the fishers and conservationists of
the take teams." Third, the scientist on the take team can also act as a
liaison with the regional scientific peer review group to ensure that
recommendations related to scientific research are given proper attention.
Finally, participation by scientists makes the scientific aspects of the
management process more transparent.2 65 Since fishers tend to be skeptical
and challenge data, the presence of an individual with scientific expertise
lends credibility to the underlying scientific information.
Nevertheless, the issue of reliable and sufficient scientific data upon
which to develop and implement take reduction plans is critical to partici-
pants' perception of the legitimacy of the process. NMFS must make every
attempt to acquire accurate stock assessment, bycatch, effort, and observer
data in a timely fashion. Furthermore, that data must be presented and
262, RESOLVE, supra note 249, at 19.
263. Young, supra note 252, at 210-211.
264, Id. at 211.
265. Id.
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statistically analyzed in a manner that is accessible to all team members.
Finally, NMFS must work with take reduction team members to better
integrate the scientific process with the management process to garner
greater understanding and acceptance of the available science and the
biological premise for PBR and the MMPA.
E NMFS Implementation of the Take Reduction Plans
Perhaps the greatest downfall in the take reduction team process was
not the negotiation, but the implementation of the product. In every case,
NMFS failed to implement the take reduction plans within the statutory
timeframe. In the cases of the GOMTRT and the MATRT, NMFS had to
be sued to implement the consensus portion of those plans. NMFS also
made other critical errors, attempting to implement the take reduction plans
under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act and using the take reduction team process to close
fisheries, the author believes this violates the intention of the MMPA's take
reduction team process. There also exists a disturbing reality that NMFS
is reluctant to accord this process the same level of importance as the
fishery management council process. For those individuals engaged in this
process, and whose livelihoods depend on the outcome, the process is
equally important to fishery management council deliberations. Yet, as
previously noted, NMFS does not require the staff that has the decision-
making authority, such as the regional administrator, to attend negotiations.
Furthermore, as in the case of the ALWTRT, when consensus was not
reached on a plan, NMFS ignored areas where there was common ground
evident in the history of the debate. If the group dynamics had been
properly analyzed, a plan resulting in less controversy and greater risk
reduction could have been promulgated by NMFS. The ultimate question
is exactly how NMFS views this conglomerate body of parties. NMFS
through its actions, has at times demonstrated that the take reduction team's
views and comments carry no greater weight than those of the general
public. This goes against the MMPA's intent in devise the take reduction
team as an advisory body to devise, through a consensus negotiation, the
take reduction plan-the basis for the regulations that would ultimately
govern the fishery interactions with marine mammals.
In conclusion, take reduction teams are a valuable multi-party process,
having great potential to yield effective conservation strategies for the
elimination of marine mammal entanglement in gear of commercial fishing
operations. However, the take reduction teams and plans rely heavily on
the good faith efforts and commitment of all participants, effective and
timely implementation of plans, and adequacy of resources to gather
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information needed to evaluate whether the plan is achieving its goals. The
success of these teams hinges on NMFS's ability to be an active participant
and secure the necessary resources. To date, NMFS has severely under-
mined this process and the good faith that developed among the various
interest groups in the course of the negotiations. This obstacle cannot be
overlooked because the implementation of plans is not in the control of
either the environmental community or the fishing industry, but instead
rests with NMFS. Therefore, the CMC strongly recommends that NMFS
give higher priority to the take reduction team process, the implementation
of the plan, the commitment of its decision-makers to be active participants
in the process, and the view that the take reduction team is as an advisory
body on par with the fishery management council.
